Loading...

PGA’s vision is to contribute to the creation of a Rules-Based International Order for a more equitable, safe, sustainable and democratic world.

1. Erosion of democratic principles

1.1 Separation of powers and checks and balances

Although no single causal factor can cause democratic backsliding, some elements may inform parliamentarians that their country is regressing:

Extreme political polarization

Rise of anti-democratic political actors, including radical right-wing or left-wing populists

Political violence

Persecution of dissent

Use of force by the police to curtail peaceful protest

For democracy to work effectively, all three branches of government - the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary - must be independent and work in their domain of influence to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect principles of transparency, good governance, and accountability, and the rule of law. The Constitution of each country determines the interplay among branches. Each branch of government has specific powers to check the other branches to prevent one from becoming too powerful and undermining the others.

The Latimer principles¹ for Commonwealth countries provide a framework for governments, parliaments, and courts to implement fundamental values, which can be emulated and tailored in countries outside the Commonwealth.

In 2020, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) published its Model Law,² seeking to create Parliamentary Service Commissions, which would be responsible for setting policies, guidelines, and strategies to enhance the functions and performance of Parliaments and manage risk and financial transparency. They would also provide clarity to other institutions, including the executive, Members of Parliament, staff, and the public, as to who is responsible, accountable, and answerable for the management and governance of parliament.

An effective parliament carries out satisfactorily its core functions of representation, legislation, and oversight, having the legal, administrative, and financial capacity to do so and using this capacity in practice. It also carries out a vision and strategy, transparently managing its resources and evaluating its performance.

During emergencies, power tends to concentrate in the executive branch of the state. Authoritarian governments exploit crises to subvert human rights and undermine democratic institutions by designing oppressive rules that favor their ideological priorities. It is paramount that democratic governments do not use crises to unilaterally impose decrees without due consideration to the separation of powers.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, parliaments faced many challenges. Some parliaments were under attack. In some countries, the executive branch and the security and armed forces of the state perpetrated violence against legislators and civilians and overstepped their legal authority. Governments worldwide used the pandemic to justify taking extra powers beyond what is reasonably necessary to protect public health. In addition, emergency powers interfered with the legislative and judicial branches, and restrictions were severe against opposition members. Autocratic regimes used the pandemic as an excuse to oppress political opponents further and curtail freedoms and rights.

Case studies

El Salvador

In June 2020, El Salvador’s³ President Bukele decreed mandatory home quarantine for 30 days. A severe institutional crisis that began on 9 February preceded this measure. The national army broke into the Assembly at the President’s behest to secure financing for a $109 million loan for his national security strategy. This was an unprecedented act, and the encroachment of the armed forces into the Assembly entailed a severe violation of democratic principles and the separation of powers.

When he became president, Nayib Bukele started providing state forces with greater capacity and equipment to fight gangs, including the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18. To guarantee greater control, the president warned that security forces could use “lethal force” to control the murders and declared a state of maximum emergency in the country’s penitentiaries. He decided on the confinement of prisoners for 24 hours to avoid communication among members of the same gangs and ordered those members of different gangs to be in the same cells. Various domestic and internationally respected organizations (including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) criticized these measures due to the serious likelihood that they could worsen the health emergency. The images of overcrowded prisons and inhumane treatment of prisoners provoked harsh criticism and visceral reactions.

President Bukele publicly authorized the military and state bodies to proceed with arrests to neutralize the increase in COVID-19 infections. The Supreme Court of Justice issued several resolutions declaring these arrests illegal under domestic law; however, the President repeatedly ignored the Court’s pronouncements. Adding to the list of controversial political decisions, Bukele unilaterally extended the state of emergency, which had expired at the end of April 2020, despite the Legislative Assembly declining to extend it. The Office of the Public Prosecutor considered that this extension was not in accordance with the law since the President had decided it without the possibility for the Legislative Assembly to use its prerogatives and decide on the state of emergency.

These measures against the legislature and judiciary are not only indicative of President Bukele’s working tactics to neutralize the branches of the state but also have become an oppressive weapon to generate fear among members of the Legislative Assembly. Several parliamentarians recognized that they were at a crossroads and feared to take such a step due to the likelihood of retaliation against them. Some legislators subjected to political persecution requested political asylum from neighboring governments.

In addition, on March 27, 2022, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador approved the Legislative Decree No. 333, marking the beginning of an unprecedented state of exception. President Nayib Bukele proposed this measure to address the security crisis driven by gang violence. Since then, the state of exception has been successively extended on more than 15 occasions and has resulted in the detention of more than 71,000 people.

Malaysia⁴

On 2 August 2021, one hundred and seven opposition Members of Parliament (MPs) made their way to the Parliament premises in a context of increasing political tension between the government and Malaysia’s constitutional monarch over the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Emergency Ordinance imposed. The Royal Malaysian Police and the riot police, also known as the Federal Reserve Unit, met peaceful legislators heading to Parliament as they blocked every access road to the premises.Barricades were set up two kilometers from the parliament’s main gate, preventing Malaysian lawmakers from entering. With nowhere else to assemble, dozens of MPs gathered in Merdeka Square, urging the Prime Minister to resign. As they planned to walk to parliament, the riot police threatened them with coercive measures, inter alia, water cannons. The day after, the police called eight MPs to ‘assist’ in the police investigation of the peaceful demonstrations; the police said that they would question all MPs present in the framework of their investigations.

Ecuador⁵

On May 17, President Guillermo Lasso issued Executive Decree 741 (available in Spanish) to dissolve the opposition-led National Assembly, invoking the constitutional mechanism called “mutual death” or “cross-death.” Since the new 2008 Constitution, this is the first use of this provision.

Article 148 of the Ecuadorian Constitution grants the President the authority to dissolve the National Assembly to renew the executive and legislative powers under three circumstances: (i) when, in his/her opinion, [the Assembly] has taken up duties that do not pertain to it under the Constitution, upon a prior favorable ruling by the Constitutional Court, or (ii) if it repeatedly, without justification, obstructs the implementation of the National Development Plan, or (iii) because of a severe political crisis and domestic unrest.

The dissolution of the National Assembly came amidst mounting political tensions, a perceived need for government reform, and only one day after the beginning of the impeachment hearing against the President. The President has been marred in corruption scandals leading to an impeachment process in the context of growing socioeconomic discontent illustrated by record-low approval ratings.

The same day President Lasso dissolved the Legislature, opposition members submitted various lawsuits before the Constitutional Court alleging that the move was illegal, as Ecuador is not facing any urgent internal upheaval. However, the Court rejected the cases before it - paving the way for early presidential and legislative elections - and determined that it does not have jurisdiction to “rule on the verification and motivation of the cause of the serious political crisis, and internal upheaval invoked.”

Tunisia⁶

On 25 July 2021, President Kais Saied announced that he would be implementing extraordinary measures, including suspending parliament for thirty days with a possibility to extend such suspension, lifting parliamentary immunity, and taking over the supervision of the Office of Public Prosecution.

These measures concentrated power in the hands of the President, who deemed his actions necessary to tackle the consequential political crisis and relied on Article 80 of the Constitution of 2014. However, the article clearly states that parliament “shall be deemed to be in a state of continuous session.” On 26 July 2021, military forces did not allow members of the parliament to enter the parliament premises, including its president, Rachid Ghannouchi, and the police raided the Al Jazeera office in Tunis without proper legal documents.

Some sub-indicators⁷ to measure the effectiveness, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, inclusiveness, participation, and representation of parliaments are:

Parliamentary autonomy (institutional, procedural, budgetary, administrative);
Members of Parliament (status of MPs, immunity, access to resources, professional development);
Parliamentary procedures (institutional framework, rules of procedure, crisis procedures, quorum, debate, voting, records);
Parliamentary organization (plenary, speaker, bureau, committees, cross-party groups);
Administrative capacity and independence (policy analysis, research and library services, innovation and digital technologies, information management);
Law-making (legislative procedure, legislative drafting, post-legislative scrutiny);
Oversight (Election, confidence, no-confidence, censure or impeachment of the Head of State or government and/or ministers, parliamentary access to information from government, parliamentary questions, hearings);
Budget (formulation, examination, amendment and approval, ex-post control, public accounts committee, supreme audit institution);
Representational function (opposition, constituents’ relations);
Relations of Parliament (with the executive, the judiciary, sub-national parliaments and authorities, and local government bodies); and
Specific state policies (SDGs and the 2030 Agenda, Human rights, security, defense, foreign affairs, parliamentary diplomacy, and inter-parliamentary cooperation).

Parliaments can implement⁸ them to ensure an evidenced-based evaluation of the institution’s health and have qualitative data to improve areas where there are gaps.

1.2 Independence of the Judiciary⁹

Democracy cannot exist absent the rule of law, and there is no rule of law without an independent judiciary enshrined in the Constitution and guaranteed by the state. All democratic institutions must respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. Judges primarily interpret laws issued by the Legislative branch and perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.

The judiciary decides on facts in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats, or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. The judiciary has jurisdiction over issues of a judicial nature and exclusive authority over matters within its competence as defined by law.

Unwarranted interference in the judicial process or courts’ decision is inappropriate and illegal. There shall not be any improper or unjustified interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review, mitigation, or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary as established by the law.

The principle of independence of the judiciary entitles and requires it to ensure that judicial proceedings are fair and respect the parties’ rights in accordance with due process standards. States shall provide their judiciary with adequate resources to perform its mandate. However, some states have subverted their judiciary and converted it into a repressive machine, doing the bidding of the executive branch against its opponents. An emblematic case of such persecution is that of Leila de Lima.

Case studies

The Philippines

On 24 February 2017, former Senator and prisoner of conscience Leila de Lima, a fierce critic of then President Rodrigo Duterte, was arrested on politically motivated drug trafficking charges. In apparent retaliation for leading a Senate inquiry into the “drug war” extrajudicial killings, the police fabricated the charges. On 17 February 2021, Senator de Lima was acquitted in one of the three cases against her. The former Senator was acquitted in the second case in May 2023 after key witnesses withdrew their evidence.¹⁰

Burundi

On 8 October 2020, former opposition lawmaker Mr. Fabien Banciryanino was arbitrarily detained on charges of undermining state security, defamation, and “calumny and rebellion against institutions.” As a fierce, outspoken opposition MP and human rights defender, Mr. Banciryanino documented politically motivated killings and enforced disappearances allegedly perpetrated by state security forces. Additionally, he vehemently objected to Burundi pulling out of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which earned him death threats and continuous persecution. “Rebellion” and “threatening state security” have been used as grounds for the illegal detention of other human rights defenders, such as Germain Rukuki, currently serving a 32-year prison sentence.

Cambodia¹¹

Ahead of the July 2023 national elections, the Government of Cambodia increased its attacks on opposition members. The Government’s violent rhetoric has led to severe violations of human rights. Political activists are in detention, and the judiciary is not prosecuting individuals responsible for assaulting opposition members.

Prime Minister Hun Sen has threatened physical violence and arrests of political opponents. On January 9, during a speech, he warned the opposition not to criticize the ruling Cambodian People’s Party ahead of the upcoming elections. Many opposition party members have been assaulted in Phnom Penh, and others have been convicted on politically motivated election forgery charges. In his January speech, Hun Sen told his opponents that they had a choice between accepting the rulings of the courts, over which the ruling party has complete control, or violence, stating:

I want to ask you, there are only two ways: one is the legal system, another one is the stick. Which one do you want out of those two? […]. You speak of rights to freedom of expression; I can respond by mobilizing people at your location [and] follow you to your house.

He ended the speech with a final warning:

[B]e careful if my temper is not controlled, you will be split up.

1.3 Prosecutorial Independence and accountability

Prosecutorial independence can mean:

Independence of the prosecution as an institution from other organs or
Independence of the individual prosecutor, where it exists.

Even where the prosecution as an institution is independent, the prosecution may be organized along hierarchical lines, subject to instructions from a more senior colleague. In other systems, the prosecution is based on or a part of the judiciary.

For example, in Western European countries, prosecutors institutionally depend on the executive branch, an accepted practice. However, recognition of the problems related to such prosecutorial dependence is growing. The current trend is going toward increasing the independence of prosecution services from the executive, especially in transitional democracies. In many countries in transition, the independence of judicial and prosecutorial authorities is seen as an integral part of the broader transition from authoritarianism to open, democratic societies.¹²

Case studies

Maldives¹³

Under Article 133(a) of the Constitution of the Maldives, the Attorney General is the legal advisor to the Government and a member of the Cabinet. The president appoints the Attorney General. The Attorney General advises the Government on all legal matters affecting the state, performing duties pertaining to the Attorney General’s Office and discharging all responsibilities required by the Constitution and law. The Attorney General also represents the state in all courts of the Maldives in all civil matters and promotes, protects, upholds, and defends the rule of law, public safety, freedoms of the public, and the country’s public interest.

Under Article 221 of the Constitution, the Prosecutor General is appointed by the President with most of the People’s Majlis (Parliament) consent. As per Article 220 (c) of the Constitution, the Prosecutor General is independent and impartial, and he shall not be under the direction or control of any person or authority in carrying out his responsibilities and exercising his powers. He shall carry out his responsibilities and exercise his powers, duties, and responsibilities as set out in Article 223 of the Constitution without fear, favor, or prejudice, subject only to the general policy directives of the Attorney General and based on fairness, transparency, and accountability.

The Prosecutor General is constitutionally independent and impartial, but the office may be susceptible to pressures because of the political appointment procedure.¹⁴

Mexico

President López Obrador has attacked the judicial branch on many occasions. He has, with some of his government members, commented negatively on adverse judicial decisions by exhibiting, blaming, and announcing criminal complaints against judges. Government members have suggested that the impunity level in the country is a result of the inefficiency of the judicial branch. It is important to note that, according to Mexico’s victimization survey (Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública, ENVIPE), the majority of crimes never come before a judge because of underreporting, gaps in the investigation, or failure by the prosecutor’s office to bring charges. López Obrador has equated the fundamental judicial safeguard of due process with “technicalities.” For the government, the judiciary is not a legitimate democratic institution.

Created in 2018, the National Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General de la República, FGR) acts as an autonomous institution. Its work is technical and relies on evidence, not political agendas. Under the current National Prosecutor, the FGR has not proven its independence from the executive branch. An autonomous, technical, and effective FGR is fundamental to the rule of law in Mexico.

The National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) is an autonomous federal body that examines complaints of human rights violations. The CNDH also files constitutional challenges and generally promotes human rights. Under the current Commissioner, the institution has lost credibility by taking positions in support of the presidential agenda, including militarization and electoral reform. In February 2023, the CNDH publicly called on human rights NGOs and the media not to share the findings of their investigation of soldiers’ arbitrary killing of a group of young people.

Parliamentarians have a role in establishing general principles and criteria for judicial and prosecutorial offices. It is also common for the parliament to appoint or dismiss public prosecutors following a nomination by the executive branch or some expert body. The issues arise when parliaments criticize the prosecutor’s decision in individual cases. Regretfully, when there is public concern about a particular case, the politicians are most likely to be active, and the line between general commentary and interference becomes tenuous. Parliamentarians, because they operate within a political landscape, tend to be responsive to the views of the media with the power to boost and destroy careers.

There is a great danger that legislative control over the prosecutor’s work can become a vehicle by which media pressures undermine the prosecutor’s independence. Prosecutors can also be subjected to populist demands, especially when there is a lot of press on a high-profile case. A prosecutor who has to appear before the parliament or its committees should be answerable only in the most general terms for prosecution policy rather than the decisions made in individual cases. The Venice Commission has expressed the view that “accountability to Parliament in individual cases of prosecution or non-prosecution should be ruled out.”

If parliament is to have a say in the dismissal of a prosecutor, it should be only after receiving a report from an impartial expert group on the prosecutor’s misconduct, and parliament should not have the power to dismiss the prosecutor because of a disagreement over a specific case.

Under international standards, several guidelines offer advice to parliamentarians on prosecutorial independence, accountability, and organization.

The United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors:¹⁵ general and non-binding.
- Eighteen articles address the qualifications, career path, and service conditions of prosecutors, as well as their role in criminal proceedings.
Council of Europe Recommendations on the role of public prosecution:¹⁶
- The Council of Europe’s Recommendation 19/200036 contains 39 recommendations concerning the organization, powers, rights, and duties of public prosecutors. The Recommendations are more detailed than the UN Guidelines and aim at “identify[ing] the major guiding principles […] that ought to govern” public prosecution services, given the existence of two separate systems in Europe. The Recommendations naturally relate only to Council members but may inspire other countries to tailor them to their systems.
International tribunals’ standards and ICC code of conduct:
- The prosecutorial standards of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia¹⁷ and the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor of International Criminal Court¹⁸ apply to the prosecutors of the Tribunal and Court, respectively. Yet, these are instruments for international institutions but are entirely consistent with the practice of the principal legal systems. Thus, they constitute contemporary expressions of standards that, by their nature and design, represent and are declarative of a shared minimum.
The International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) Standard:
- The Standards of Professional Responsibility¹⁹ is a “working document for use by prosecution services to develop and reinforce their standards.” The IAP Standards address prosecutors’ professional conduct, independence, neutrality, professional role, obligations towards other state organs, and rights to protection in their professional capacity. The IAP Standards are a private and non-binding initiative and understandably address the perspective of prosecutors rather than that of other institutional actors, but they may reasonably be said to represent “standards and principles which are generally recognized internationally as necessary for the proper and independent prosecution of offences.”
American Bar Association (ABA) standards:²⁰
- The ABA has developed a series of standards for the prosecutorial function and an international Prosecutorial Reform Index, which draws on them. The 42 standards cover the full range of actions, powers, obligations, and institutional relationships affecting prosecutors and prosecution services. The ABA’s Standards reflect an American perspective and have no authority outside the particular context of the United States. These standards are influential and can be emulated in different systems. They are also of interest because the ABA’s Prosecutorial Reform Index analyzes various countries’ prosecution services in light of the ABA standards in a comparative analysis.
- Parliamentarians can take on these different standards when dealing with policy and legislation that touch upon the structure of relationships between governments, courts, legislatures, police, and prosecution services and how to encourage neutrality and fairness in the administration of criminal justice.
- These guidelines and recommendations are convenient and compelling, backed by recognized regional and international bodies and representative professional organizations.

1.4 Attacks on civil and political rights

Civil and political rights are a class of rights that protect individuals’ freedom from infringement by governments, social organizations, and private individuals. They ensure one’s ability to participate in the civil and political life of society and the state. The rights include the protection of people’s physical and mental integrity, life, and safety; protection from discrimination on grounds such as sex, race, sexual orientation, national origin, color, age, political affiliation, ethnicity, social class, religion, and disability; and individual rights such as privacy and the freedom of thought, speech, religion, press, assembly, and movement.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) aims to ensure the protection of the aforementioned rights, where countries that have ratified the covenant undertake to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights. The Human Rights Committee periodically examines reports on implementing the legal obligations of countries that are States Parties to the ICCPR.

Targeted rights under the ICCPR were under threat by many governments during the global pandemic, especially (1) restrictions on speech and assembly, (2) intrusions on privacy, (3) modifications to or delays in electoral processes, and (4) denials of justice and fair trial.²¹

Although the rights contained in the ICCPR are a part of jus cogens (peremptory norms of general international law from which no derogation is permitted), states violated them.

Right of Speech and Peaceful Assembly

ICCPR Article 21 provides that the “right of peaceful assembly” allows restrictions on the exercise of this right only to the extent they are necessary “in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” In General Comment No. 37, the Human Rights Committee further clarifies duties and rights under Article 21 and establishes that States Parties are not to derogate from this provision to restrict peaceful assembly “if they can attain their objectives by imposing restrictions in terms of Article 21.”

Case studies

Hong Kong

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, public authorities imposed restrictions on the preceding demonstrations, pointing to subsequent public health concerns to justify the policy. Governments have even deployed technologies for contact tracing, which are raising eyebrows as “there are a number of unresolved questions about the use of smartphone data for health surveillance, including how to protect individual privacy.” Some governments have used the pandemic as an excuse for delaying elections or for denying arrested individuals adequate legal representation in judicial proceedings.

Authorities have also denied demonstrators permission to organize a pro-democracy march because such protests could further spread COVID-19. Protest leaders have alleged that these are false pretenses and claims that restrictions are necessary to protect public health have created new barriers to demonstrations against China’s National Security Law and the Hong Kong government’s acquiescence thereto. In addition, the Government has also imposed disproportionate restrictions on journalists and human rights defenders.

Despite the clear stipulations in Article 21 of the ICCPR, governments of States Parties have taken advantage of the need to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to restrict political activity that threatens their power.

China

“The gap between the number of countries that registered overall improvements in political rights and civil liberties and those that registered overall declines in 2022 was the narrowest it has ever been through 17 consecutive years of deterioration. The number of countries with declines, at 35, was the smallest recorded since the negative pattern began. Thirty-four countries registered improvements. The gains came in various forms. Eight countries registered modest improvements in civil liberties due to the rollback of COVID-19 restrictions that had disproportionately infringed on the freedoms of assembly and movement. But the most significant positive developments were driven by competitive elections in Latin America and Africa, with politicians and ordinary people in the affected countries reaffirming their commitment to the democratic process.”²²

What can legislators do to safeguard civil and political rights?

Introduce and approve legislation and policies that advance protections for vulnerable communities disproportionately affected by human rights violations;
Introduce and approve legislation and policies that increase support for human rights defenders:
Question the executive branch on the different policies to prevent and address civil and political rights violations;
In the national budget, allocate adequate educational resources so the youth may be aware of their rights;
Denounce violations in your country, region, and elsewhere, especially authoritarian behaviors;
When engaging with all stakeholders, especially within your political party and with your constituents, tirelessly defend the virtues of democracy;
Relentlessly defend democratic values and principles in multilateral fora and countries or regions at a turning point; and
Request PGA technical assistance.

1.5 Closing space for civil society organizations: foreign agent laws

Civil society is fundamental to a vibrant and inclusive democracy. It improves the culture of accountability and transparency, strengthens government effectiveness and responsiveness, and increases public trust in government.²³

According to the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), civic space is the environment enabling civil society to play a role in our societies’ political, economic, and social life. It allows individuals and groups to contribute to policy-making that affects their lives, including by:

Accessing information;
Engaging in dialogue;
Expressing dissent or disagreement; and
Joining together to express their views.

Although regional and international instruments protect civic space, parliaments and parliamentarians must ensure that these international standards are implemented in the domestic legal and policy realms.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the fundamental global standard that outlines an international obligation to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. Several regional instruments complement this global standard, including:

The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The Asian Human Rights Charter
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man

While each of these regional instruments protects a wide range of civic freedoms and human rights, the vibrancy of civic space and the success of civil society organizations (CSOs) operating therein largely depends on an enabling environment at the country level.

What Can Legislators Do?

Parliaments, through law-making and the domestication of relevant international laws and standards, can:

Safeguard and expand civic space through parliament’s law-making function: Parliaments are responsible for ensuring that domestic laws comply with international commitments and standards, such as freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, freedom of association, right to privacy and non-discrimination, and others as provided in the international laws and standards. An example is the significant progress in freedom of information (FOI) laws across Africa. Though levels of implementation vary, many African countries now have legal provisions supporting FOI (UNESCO 2021).²⁴
Safeguard and expand civic space through effective oversight and parliamentary oversight: Oversight provides an essential check on government powers and protects civic space. Effective oversight will not only help protect civic space, but it can also improve the quality of governance and help parliament achieve its foundational objective of ensuring government actions and policies reflect and represent the needs of the citizens. Parliaments can deploy different oversight tools such as summons, interpellations, and votes of no confidence and impeachment against the government for human rights violations or actions that restrict or constrain civic space. In 2022, the Ugandan Parliament proactively summoned the prime minister and party leaders to deliberate and find solutions to the country’s perpetual allegations of human rights violations.²⁵
Safeguard and expand civic space through meaningful public engagement in parliamentary processes: This can send strong signals that parliaments respect space for public discourse and that all voices should be heard in the functioning of the legislature. According to the Global Parliamentary Report of 2022, parliaments can engage with CSOs and the public in the following areas (IPU and UNDP 2022: 21):
- Information: keeping citizens and civil society well informed on parliamentary business
- Education: increasing citizen understanding of parliaments and the country’s parliamentary process
- Communication: introducing and establishing channels and avenues for interaction between citizens and parliamentarians
- Consultation: building on collective knowledge to inform parliamentary work and processes
- Participation: actively involving CSOs and the public in parliamentary processes

Parliaments can also play a role in the closing of civic space. Though most restrictive actions against civic space are typically attributed to the executive, parliaments can also be enablers and perpetrators of civic space restrictions (Keutgen and Dodsworth 2020; Lorchi, Onken, and Sombatpoonsiri 2021). Parliament’s contribution to the closing of civic space relates to the extent to which they enact restrictive laws and do not hold governments to account for actions that restrict civic space. Hence, civil society representatives must advocate for defending and strengthening civic space and ensure that parliamentarians are aware of the value of inclusive citizen and civil society participation in democratic processes.

Building the knowledge, awareness, and capacity of parliamentarians around tackling civic space issues will ensure effective parliaments are able to prevent government threats to civic space. Awareness-raising engagement with parliamentarians exposes them to evidence based on research and data. Building the capacity of even one MP strengthens the parliamentary institution. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union and UNDP, “effective parliamentary oversight is a rigorous, constructive and evidence-based process designed to improve all aspects of society and national governance” (IPU & UNDP 2017).

Another aspect of the closing space is foreign agent laws. Many countries continue to restrict the registration of LGBTQI+ organizations, whether through laws impeding the operations of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) - including so-called foreign agent laws - or through discriminatory practices targeting organizations working on gender and sexuality. Where LGBTQI+ organizations cannot register openly, they often devise other strategies, such as registering under general human rights, women’s rights, health, youth, or development themes. Civil society organizations sometimes register as for-profit or not-for-profit companies, which may require fewer bureaucratic obstacles than NGO registration.²⁶

Democratic principles and institutions foster the trust of the public. Parliamentarians are responsible for setting up the mechanisms that will ensure that the trust put in them by their constituents remains. The power resides with ‘we the people,’ and it is entrusted to representatives who translate the people’s will into laws and policies.

Parliamentarians can consult tools from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), such as the Trust Survey Report, to understand where parliaments stand in a given country and, more importantly, discuss the drivers of trust. “[T]rust is a fragile societal asset. While it takes time to establish, it can be lost quickly. Analyzing what drives trust in public institutions and what actions are required to preserve it is essential for ensuring public governance systems deliver policies that improve people’s lives.”

Footnotes:

1 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Three Branches of Government, November 2023.

2 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Model Law for Independent Parliaments, 2020.

3 Parliamentarians for Global Action, Urgent Action Alert 2: El Salvador, June 2020.

4 Parliamentarians for Global Action, Malaysian Government Must Respect Constitutional Rights of Opposition Legislators, August 2021.

5 Parliamentarians for Global Action, Bras de Fer between Ecuador’s Executive and National Assembly: Mutual Destruction, 25 May 2023.

6 Parliamentarians for Global Action, Tunisian authorities must respect democratic institutions, August 2021.

7 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Indicators for Democratic Parliaments Based on SDG Targets 16.6 and 16.7.

8 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), How to use the indicators – Assessment Guidance.

9 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted on 6 September 1985.

10 Amnesty International, Philippines: Leila de Lima’s acquittal a long-overdue step towards justice, May 2023.

11 Human Rights Watch, Renewed Attacks on Political Opposition, April 2023.

12 Open Society Institute Sofia, Promoting Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence and Effectiveness, 2008.

13 Mariyam Sahula, Areef Ahmed Naseer and Md. Ershadul Karim, Legal System and Research of Maldives.

14 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), The Independence of Judges and Prosecutors: Perspectives and Challenges, 15 March 2011.

15 United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (adopted by Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 189 (1990).

16 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation 19/2000 [Rec. 2000/19] of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system (adopted Oct. 6, 2000).

17 Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Standards of Professional Conduct for Prosecution Counsel.

18 International Criminal Court, Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, [Date of entry into force: 5 September 2013].

19 International Association of Prosecutors, Standards of Professional Responsibility and Statement of the Essential Duties and Rights of Prosecutors adopted Apr. 23, 1999.

20 American Bar Association, Prosecution Function, Fourth Edition (2017) of the Criminal Justice Standard for the Prosecution Function.

21 Oona A. Hathaway, Mark Stevens and Preston Lim, COVID-19, and International Law Series: Human Rights Law – Civil and Political Rights, Just Security, 24 November 2020.

22 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023 Report.

23 David Olusegun Sotola, Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer Parliaments and Civic Space, 16 August 2023.

24 Ibid.

25 Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, Tayebwa summons Premier, Ministers over human rights violations.

26 Outright, The Global State of LGBTIQ Organizing: The Right to Register and the Freedom to Operate, September 2023.