

PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR GLOBAL ACTION

ACCION MUNDIAL DE PARLAMENTARIOS

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***THE IMPACT OF ARMED VIOLENCE ON DEVELOPMENT –
ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND PARLIAMENTARY SOLUTIONS***

INFORMAL BACKGROUND PAPER

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although some segments of the population benefit from it in the short term, armed violence has been shown to impoverish individuals and undermine economic development and social progress. Armed conflicts negatively impact economic output, national infrastructure, educational achievement, social cohesion and public health long after military operations have ceased. Moreover, in countries not experiencing armed conflict - particularly in Southern Africa and Central and South America - criminal violence creates conditions as bad as or worse than those of a war zone. Acts of state sanctioned violence such as enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings can also undermine achievements in economic, political and human development.

In war and during periods of high crime, productive capital – including roads, bridges, telephone lines, houses and other assets - may be destroyed, agricultural activities are frequently disrupted and professionals with valuable skills and resources may flee the country or be killed. Violent armed criminality has also been shown to undermine economic performance and divert public and private resources away from more productive activities. Armed conflict and other manifestations of armed violence create a climate of fear which may significantly decrease school enrollment, particularly among girls. Moreover, war and other forms of violence in the developing world often undermine healthcare infrastructure and lead to increased mortality from otherwise preventable diseases. Populations displaced or otherwise affected by war are usually more susceptible to malnutrition, disease and injury. Public health data shows that children under the age of five and pregnant women are among the most vulnerable segments of the population during violent conflict.

Although men and boys are much more likely to commit and to be the victims of direct acts of armed violence, women and girls are much more likely to suffer from indirect effects such as reduced access to food, clean water or healthcare. Violence against women persists in post-conflict and non-conflict environments. For instance, sexual violence - especially intimate partner violence (IPV) - frequently goes unreported or unprosecuted due to cultural or historical traditions.

In many countries, high levels of armed violence correspond with a widespread availability of small arms and light weapons. Basic services such as health care and education can become overwhelmed by the threat and misuse of firearms. Moreover, state purchases of expensive and, at times, unnecessary conventional arms may divert resources away from health, education and other human service sectors without measurable benefit to the country or its citizenry.

States, inter-governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations have adopted a range of measures to respond to the negative consequences of armed violence. Many legally binding regional agreements require state parties to assess arms purchases and sales based on their potential impact on sustainable development. Moreover, in 2002, a group of Nobel Laureates proposed the creation of an International Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which would further codify international law prohibiting the transfer of arms in instances when it is known (or should be known) that the recipient will use the weapons to violate norms of human rights or international humanitarian law. Since the late 1990s, development and security professionals have been working together to identify practical ways to support 'security sector reform' particularly in countries emerging from civil war. Progress is being made on many fronts, but much work remains to be done to ensure that armed violence does not undermine fundamental human rights and collective efforts to promote lasting human development.

THE IMPACT OF ARMED VIOLENCE ON DEVELOPMENT – ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND PARLIAMENTARY SOLUTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION:

All countries experience armed violence to one degree or another whether they are involved in civil or interstate war, or localized manifestations of criminal or political violence. While only a small number of countries account overwhelmingly for the global toll of 'direct conflict deaths' (that is, those incurred by combatants who are directly involved in military operations), experts have observed that war "generates a series of lethal but indirect impacts on communities beyond the number of people killed in battle or combat" (2008 GDS pp. 28, 31). Armed conflict has been shown to negatively impact economic output, national infrastructure, educational achievement, social cohesion and public health even long after military operations have ceased. Moreover, even in countries that are not experiencing armed conflict, large and small-scale criminal and politically motivated violence has been shown to impoverish individuals, households, communities and nations. Scholars, aid agencies and governments have, for some time, been aware of the link between armed conflict and poverty, but are just beginning to systematically assess the impact of armed violence more broadly defined as the range of environments in which weapons are available (particularly small arms and light weapons) and used to threaten or do harm. Armed violence generally falls into one of three categories:

1. Armed conflict (i.e. war): “a situation where armed violence is being used by one or more parties in the context of a political conflict, characteristically an internalized conflict” (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 10);
2. Violent criminality: The systematic or opportunistic use of violence for criminal or related purposes;
3. State sponsored violence: Violence systematically undertaken by agents of the state that may or may not be considered legal under national law, but that violates basic human rights as defined under international law.

This study first considers the global and interrelated aspects of armed violence, and then assesses in more detail the development impacts of various manifestations of armed violence through four lenses:

1. Trade and investment dimensions of armed violence;
2. Health and education dimensions of armed violence;
3. Gender dimension of armed violence;
4. Security dimension of armed violence.

The document gives particular attention to three disturbing problems of international concern which exacerbate armed violence and undermine development: the illegal drug trade, human trafficking and the international illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The study concludes by briefly mentioning a few multilateral initiatives to prevent and mitigate the detrimental effects of armed violence.

II. GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF ARMED VIOLENCE:

War

Although international wars tend to receive more attention in the international press, today, most wars are civil wars (2003 Collier et al. p. 1). Although they tend to attract less attention, civil wars usually result in much higher casualty rates and go on for longer periods of time. A 2003 World Bank study defines them as follows:

“A civil war occurs when an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government militarily and the resulting violence results in more than 1,000 combat related deaths with at least five percent on each side (2003 Collier et al. p. 11). “

Of course, many civil wars also involve neighboring countries or other states to one degree or another. Unlike wars in the past, most of the casualties of modern civil wars are civilians – the largest number are children under the age of five (2009 Rubenstein p. 14). At the beginning of the 20th century, about 90 percent of the victims of all wars were military personnel. By the end of the 19th century, approximately

90 percent of war casualties were civilians (2003 Collier et al. p. 17). The extent of this indirect burden of armed conflict depends on a number of factors including the quality of preexisting health care facilities; the types of diseases endemic within the conflict affected zone; the intensity and duration of the fighting; the degree to which civilian populations are able to circulate in order to avoid combat zones and ensure basic needs; and the degree to which humanitarian organizations have access to war affected populations (2008 GDS p. 41). Since health, education and other infrastructure destroyed during war cannot necessarily be quickly rebuilt, the negative effects of armed conflict can last for years after the end of the conflict. A 2003 World Bank study summarized the situation: “typically, war is an economic and social disaster for the affected country. Therefore, for those who care about development, civil war is a problem” (2003 Collier et al. p. 11).

Apart from death and injury, the most serious impact of armed conflict is the creation of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 15). As of the beginning of 2011, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the number of refugees worldwide to be 15.1 million people (2011 UNHCR). The Geneva based Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimates the worldwide number of IDPs to be 26 million people as of 2008 (2011 UNHCR). The creation of refugees and IDPs has become a recurrent feature in wars around the world. Sometimes, displacement is an unintended result of the climate of fear created when civilians are in close proximity to combat operations, while in other cases, parties to the conflict target civilians to intentionally cause displacement for strategic reasons. (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 15). Displacement causes “loss of access to land, property, jobs, assets and therefore means of livelihood” (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 16). Displaced people are also frequently more susceptible to infectious and communicable diseases as well as to criminal violence. (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe pp. 16-17). Overall, the result of violence induced displacement is impoverishment which may persist long after the end of the conflict.

Table 1. Direct vs. Indirect Deaths in Several Recent Armed Conflicts

	Indirect deaths as percentage of total excess deaths	Ratio of indirect to direct deaths	Conflict mortality rate (per 100,000 per year, average)	Total conflict deaths (direct and indirect)
Kosovo 1998-99	0	-	334	12,000
Iraq, 2003-07	63	3.0	246	347,000
Northern Uganda, 2005	85	5.6	476	26,000
Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2002	90+	9.0	1,316	3,300,000
Congo-Brazzaville, Pool Region, 03	83	4.8	n/a	n/a
Burundi, 1993-2003	78	3.5	500	300,000
Sierra Leone, 1991-2002	94	15.7	1,101	462,000
Darfur, Sudan, 2003-2005	69	2.3	730	142,000
South Sudan, 1999-2005	90+	9.0	1,178	427,000
Angola, 1975-2002	89	8.1	676	1,500,000
Liberia, 1989-96	86	6.1	889	175,000
East Timor, 1974-99	82	4.6	638	103,000
Iraq, 1991 war	77	3.3	784	144,500

Sources: (as cited in 2008 Global Burden of Armed Violence p. 40)

Crime

Of course, war is only one manifestation of armed violence. In some countries, organized crime, inter-communal violence, gender-based violence or political violence by actors or groups competing for power create conditions worse than those of a war zone. In 2004, approximately 490,000 people were murdered worldwide (7.6 per 100,000 population) and experts speculate that the economic cost of armed violence in non-conflict settings is approximately 0.14 percent of total global GDP (2008 GDS p. 2). According to the 2003 Small Arms Survey, “small arms related violence can be so prevalent that otherwise ‘peaceful’ states such as Brazil, Jamaica and South Africa often exhibit warlike symptoms” (2003 Atanga et al. p. 127).


Like war, the impact of crime varies greatly by region. Southern Africa, Central America and South America have the world’s highest regional homicide rates - between 20-30 per 100,000 population (2008 GDS p. 67). In a 1996 survey, respondents from across Latin America identified crime as the

region's key social and economic problem (2003 Atanga et al. p. 136). The causes and factors associated with high crime rates also vary greatly depending on the country and the context. In Africa, high murder rates (where they exist) are believed to be primarily associated with low economic output, high levels of economic and social inequality, very young populations and the effects of rapid urbanization (2008 GDS p. 72). Moreover, many of the African countries with the highest homicide rates have either a history of civil war or are located in close geographic proximity to countries experiencing conflict or extreme fragility. By contrast, GDP per capita for the Caribbean and South and Central America is about double that of Africa and the average HDI [Human Development Index] is 0.78 as compared with 0.53 in Africa. Out of a total of 41 main armed conflicts globally, 16 occurred in Africa while there were only 2 in the Americas. (2008 GDS p. 73)

These statistics imply that the dynamic of violent crime in Latin America and the Caribbean is qualitatively different than in Africa. Some experts argue that the drug trade and the presence of well organized and, in many cases, internationalized gangs drive murder and other forms of violent criminality in Latin America and the Caribbean to a greater degree than in other parts of the world.

By contrast, Asia, as a continent, has the world's lowest average intentional homicide rate (2008 GDS p. 73). But, as would be expected across such a large area, a high degree of sub regional variability exists. Moreover, certain particularly disturbing types of crime are more prevalent in Asia than in other parts of the world. So called 'honor killings' - murders (usually of women) committed by (usually male) relatives in response to a perceived violation of community, family or individual honor take place in many parts of the world, but have been primarily reported in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, Yemen and other Mediterranean and Gulf states (2008 GDS p. 120). In some countries (both in Asia and other regions), discriminatory laws or the reluctance of local authorities to enforce existing legislation can promote such crimes by granting implicit or explicit impunity to perpetrators. Other types of crime that may be underreported in some parts of Asia include assaults on women who violate social norms (similar to honor killings but non-lethal) and the practice of killing or abandoning female infants (which has markedly increased in China since the 1980s following the country's imposition of the 'One Child' policy) (2008 GDS p. 122).

Table 2: Homicide rates per 100,000 population by region and sub region 2004



Source: 2008 Global Burden of Armed Violence p. 71

Violence involving young people (aged 10 through 29) is increasingly common in many countries. The main perpetrators of acts of violence against youth are young people themselves (2002 Krug et al. p. 25). According to a 2002 report from the World Health Organization (WHO), “violence involving young people adds greatly to the costs of health and welfare services, reduces productivity, decreases the value of property, disrupts a range of essential services and generally undermines the fabric of society” (2002 Krug et al. p. 25). In the 1980s and 1990s, youth homicide rates rose sharply in many countries and today, they have reached as high as 84.4 per 100,000 in Colombia; 50.2 per 100,000 in El Salvador and 28.2 per 100,000 in Albania (compared to a global average of 9.2 per 100,000) (2002 Krug pp. 25, 26). In almost every country, young males are significantly more likely than females of the same age to be the victims and the perpetrators of armed violence.

State Sponsored Violence

Some forms of armed violence perpetrated by agents of the state can be considered illegitimate either according to the laws or constitution of the state itself, or under accepted norms of human rights. Two types of state sanctioned violence that have been pervasive in some contexts are extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. According to the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project, in

2006, extrajudicial killings occurred frequently (defined as at least 50 deaths) in at least 31 countries, and occurred occasionally (between 1 and 49 deaths) in 73 countries (2008 GDS p. 132). At least 12 of the countries with frequent extrajudicial killings were not considered “in conflict” at the time according to the Uppsala Conflict Database (2008 GDS p. 132). “Enforced disappearances” is a term used by human rights organizations to refer to disappearances committed by agents of the state (2008 GDS p. 133). The 2006 International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances defines victims of enforced disappearances as those who suffer: arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law (UNGA 2006, article 2, cited in 2008 GDS p. 133).

Although this type of violence is by its nature, very difficult to verify, human rights advocates note that there appear to be at least 12 countries where such disappearances are frequent (defined as 50 or more cases annually) and another 22 countries where such actions are more occasional (defined as fewer than 49 cases annually). (2008 GDS p. 133)

In addition to the human toll that such acts take on victims and family members, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings “can undermine the legitimacy of the state and its institutions and generate negative socioeconomic impacts” (2008 GDS p. 130). A 2008 Oxfam report points out that “communities abused by state actors with armed force are often unable to demand their rights, hold their governments to account or ensure their sustainable development” (2008 Nightingale and Hillier pp. 1-2). Such actions can also generate or deepen grievances within the population that can, over time, lead to other types of armed violence.

Counting the Economic and Social Costs of Armed Violence:

Armed violence, including interstate and civil war, organized or sporadic crime, and localized violence within communities and households, has lasting effects on not only individuals but entire societies and across long periods of time. Economists and other experts are now able to quantify, to a degree, the costs of armed violence, defined as “the short and long term measurable effects that are convertible to welfare losses” (2008 GDS p. 89). Africa, for instance, as a continent, loses at least 18 billion dollars per year due to armed conflict – this amount is equal to the entire amount of foreign aid received by the

continent annually (2008 Nightingale and Hillier p. 2). Although it would be difficult to dispute that armed violence can benefit some segments of the population, most economists agree that both war and violent crime “diminish development prospects for the majority and hinder achievement of the Millennium Development Goals” (2008 GDS p. 89). Experts estimate that violent civil conflict reduces the GDP growth of an average economy by at least two percent per year (2008 GDS p. 89). And as of 2002, almost half of the lowest ranking countries on the United Nations Human Development Index were seriously affected by armed conflict (2003 Atanga et al. p. 127).

Armed violence in non-conflict zones may have economic effects that exceed the cost of some wars (2008 GDS p. 89). A study of 90 countries experiencing some degree of non-violent armed conflict found that between 95 billion and 163.3 billion US dollars were lost as a result of decreased productivity resulting from armed violence (2008 GDS p. 89). Moreover, the psychological trauma caused by the experience of armed violence can have long term effects on both perpetrators and survivors, which (although difficult to quantify at the macro level) can result in decreased productivity and increased health costs over the long term. In war and during periods of high crime, productive capital – including roads, bridges, telephone lines, houses and other assets - may be destroyed either as collateral damage or intentionally to advance military objectives or punish uncooperative civilian populations. Moreover, human capital may be eroded due to the deaths of teachers, health care workers, carpenters, or other people with skills necessary in peacetime. Professionals with valuable skills and resources may flee the country during periods of armed violence, further eroding human capital. Likewise, an increase in armed violence has been shown to lead to capital flight and reduce investor and consumer confidence in many countries. Armed violence increases the amount of capital that a state must devote to military and police expenses which consequently limits welfare spending. In recent years, experts have developed increasingly sophisticated methods to quantify the economic effects of war and crime, further confirming the net economic losses associated with armed violence.

Arms and other weapons can undermine development even without being used. State purchases of expensive weapons systems or large quantities of small arms can divert resources that could otherwise benefit development objectives. The opportunity cost of arms spending is even higher when purchases do not correspond with the actual security risks faced by a country, or when procurement processes are corrupted due to a lack of effective oversight. Although most civilian homicides and direct combat deaths involve small arms and light weapons, larger conventional weapons systems such as warships

and fighter jets “can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, making large conventional arms the greatest risk for opportunity cost” (2008 Nightingale and Hillier p. 2).

The following sections examine in more detail the effects of armed violence on specific aspects of economic and social development including trade and investment, health, education, gender equity and human security.

III. EFFECTS OF ARMED VIOLENCE ON SPECIFIC SECTORS

Armed Violence and Development – the Trade Dimension

As mentioned above, although certain individuals and groups may benefit from it in the short term, armed violence has widespread negative economic and social consequences that frequently persist long after the crises that cause them. Countries at war tend to grow on average around 2.2 percentage points more slowly than during peacetime (2003 Collier et al. p. 17). Thus, after a typical civil war of seven years, incomes would be around 15 percent lower than if the war had not happened - this corresponds to approximately a 30 percent increase in absolute poverty (2003 Collier et al. p. 17). A 2001 study of 18 countries affected by civil war found that macroeconomic indicators in all of the countries considered in the study worsened during conflict and, perhaps more surprisingly, many indicators continued to worsen for years after the end of the conflict – in 15 of the 18 countries, per capita income fell; in 13 countries, food production diminished; in all 18 countries, external debt increased as a percentage of GDP; and in 12 countries, export growth declined (2003 Collier et al. p. 17).

Of course, the scope of war significantly influences the magnitude of its economic effects. A 2000 report from the Harvard Center for International Development (CID) found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that “wars that spill out across the entire country, require the highest level of military recruitment, and result in the greatest number of fatalities are the most damaging to the domestic economy” (2000 Imai and Weinstein p. 2). Non-conflict countries experiencing high levels of armed violence have documented similar effects on macroeconomic indicators. In the case of violent armed criminality, the negative impacts on macroeconomic performance are believed to be largely due to the indirect impact of the climate of insecurity, as well as the public and private resources diverted from more productive activities. In 2002 for instance, Brazil spent 10 percent of its GDP on combating criminal violence; in 1997, El Salvador spent a staggering 25 percent of its GDP in this area (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 23).

Decreases in public investment and infrastructure loss during war have been well documented. According to a World Bank study, developing countries spend, on average, about 2.8 percent of their GDP on defense during peacetime. During war, however, military spending usually increases to about 5 percent of GDP. The additional 2.2 percent of GDP spent over a period of seven years (the average time span for modern civil wars) results in a permanent loss of around 2 percent of GDP (2003 Collier et al. p. 14). This figure only takes into account government spending. In the case of civil war, spending by rebel groups further diverts resources away from productive activities (2003 Collier et al. p. 14). Once wars end, military expenditures usually don't return to prewar levels but hover at an average of around 4.5 percent of GDP for at least a decade (2003 Collier et al. p. 20).

However, economists have documented that most of the losses resulting from war are not the result of decreases in public investment but are caused by the 'depreciation' (i.e. destruction) of telecommunications assets, airports, seaports, roads, bridges, homes, schools, health clinics and other infrastructure. (2003 Collier et al. p. 17). During Mozambique's civil war "about 40 percent of immobile capital in the agriculture, communication and administrative sectors were destroyed" (2003 Collier et al. p. 15). In Chechnya, "the destruction of oil wells, processing infrastructure and pipelines has sharply reduced oil production and related activities, which has created a dismal economic situation" (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 24). In Liberia during the 1990s, the Port of Monrovia suffered major damage and most of the country's electrical generating capacity was destroyed (2003 Collier et al. p. 15).

Armed conflict affects private investment as well. Wars "introduce tremendous uncertainty into the economic environment making both public and private investment riskier" (2000 Imai and Weinstein p. 1). Private investors are usually quicker to respond to changes in the security environment and have more options for substituting away from domestic assets. Thus, as business confidence decreases, individuals and companies are likely to transfer liquid assets out of the country (2000 Imai and Weinstein p. 4). According to the World Bank, as a result of civil war, the percentage of private wealth held abroad increases, on average, from around nine percent to around 20 percent (2003 Collier et al. p. 15). Capital flight has been documented to continue even after wars end. By the end of the first post-conflict decade, foreign held capital will have risen on average to 26.1 percent of all privately held capital (2003 Collier et al. p. 21). This continuation of capital flight is believed to occur because, once a country has experienced a civil war, it is much more likely to relapse into armed conflict. Investors, who

are aware of this heightened level of risk, take advantage of an end to fighting to extract capital that was unable to be removed during wartime (2003 Collier et al. p. 21).

Capital flight is not just a phenomenon among wealthy investors. Herders living close to border areas in many countries experiencing civil war have been reported to move their cattle out of the country to sell them before or during war (2003 Collier et al. p. 15). During the Liberian civil war, some residents of rural villages were reported to have removed corrugated roofing sheets from their own homes and transported them by boat to be sold in neighboring countries rather than waiting for rebels to loot them. Civil war also prompts a flight of human capital that may not decrease after the war ends. Educated professionals are usually most likely to have the resources to emigrate when the security situation deteriorates, sparking a 'brain drain.' Of course, the death and disability of professionals, skilled tradespeople and other citizens further diminishes human capital (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 14).

Armed conflict in a developing country has a massive impact on the rural asset base and other factors of agricultural production. A 2005 CICS study notes that access to arable land has been lost by removals, appropriation, land mines or despoliation; livestock, implements, and seeds have been lost, stolen or sold off to survive; and irrigation systems have been destroyed or neglected. (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 26)

In Mozambique, less than one fifth of the recorded 1980 cattle stock remained in 1992 at the end of the country's civil war (2003 Collier et al. p. 15). Agricultural activities are frequently disrupted as a result of looting of crops, the destruction of agricultural tools and other rural infrastructure by armed groups, and the abandonment of land by farmers fleeing to more secure areas. Restrictions on mobility can have a major impact on access to markets and local or even international trade. The siege of towns by rebel groups and/or militias can cut off populations from trade with other areas, preventing people from accessing food and other essential supplies and denying farmers a market for their produce. In Nepal, the establishment of checkpoints by the authorities and the destruction of bridges by Maoist rebels had a significant impact on transport and trade increasing the time spent on going to markets in some instances from about a half hour to three days (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 27). In Somalia where, in 2011, drought has led to famine, "large amounts of capital, labor and agricultural land remain underutilized because of insecurity" (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 24). Moreover, in acute drought years, the lack of mobility caused by armed conflict can have a devastating impact on livestock

productivity and mortality, as a result of insecurity at water points and the roads leading to them (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 27).

Armed conflicts also have significant spillover effects on neighboring countries. Having a neighbor at war has been shown to reduce the annual growth rates of each neighboring country by around 0.5 percentage points (2003 Collier et al. p. 35). Investors may perceive the entire region as being riskier as a result of war in one country. Regional trade patterns can also be disrupted by war in a single country. This can be a particularly severe problem for landlocked neighbors that depend on a country experiencing civil war for access to the sea. For example, the war in Mozambique doubled Malawi's international transport costs and triggered an economic decline. Similarly, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo closed the river route to the sea for the landlocked Central African Republic (2003 Collier et al. p. 35).

Civil wars can also affect neighboring states by sparking regional arms races, which can further divert public resources away from productive activities.

Armed Violence and Development – the Health and Education Dimension

Health

Armed violence has widespread negative effects on the health of civilian populations as well as the capacities of health care systems. In many developing countries, basic services such as health care, which may already be overburdened and under-resourced, are strained to the breaking point as a result of armed conflict or other manifestations of armed violence. Wars also frequently undermine the basic infrastructure on which healthcare systems depend, such as water supplies, roads and electrical grids. Available evidence suggests that the psychological trauma also escalates dramatically in war (2009 Rubenstein p. 14). At the same time health risks are increasing, war diverts public resources away from investment in healthcare. Prevention and disease surveillance programs are frequently suspended as a result of armed conflict. Prolonged wars frequently displace large populations either internally or as refugees. In refugee and IDP camps, epidemic diseases may emerge as a result of crowding, bad water and poor sanitation.

Populations that have experienced armed conflict often have among the worst indicators of infant child and maternal mortality of any countries in the world (2009 Rubenstein p. 3). In sub-Saharan Africa, infant mortality averages around 100 per 1000 live births (the world figure is 54), but during periods of

armed conflict, infant mortality reached 473 in Mozambique, 170 in Sierra Leone and 157 in Liberia (2009 Rubenstein p. 13). The under five mortality rate (measuring deaths of children under the age of five years old) in Africa averages around 171 per 1000 births (comparable world figure 79) but in Sierra Leone and Liberia the rates reached 286 and 235 respectively (2009 Rubenstein p. 14).

Apart from children, women are the next most vulnerable population in conflict zones (2009 Kim and Fernandez p. 3). A study conducted in sub-Saharan Africa found that both maternal mortality rates and under five mortality rates in conflict and post conflict zones were approximately 44 percent higher than baseline rates in non-conflict countries (2008 GDS p. 114). In Afghanistan, “twenty years of war led to a maternal mortality ratio in 2002 as high as 1,600 per 100,000 live births, and in rural areas far higher; 87 percent of these were preventable” (2009 Rubenstein p. 14). The maternal mortality rate is often an accurate indicator of the overall availability of health services in a country, since “death during childbirth is most often caused by lack of access to basic emergency obstetrical care that a functional health system would be able to provide” (2009 Rubenstein p. 14).

After wars draw to a close, health conditions may take years or even decades to return to prewar levels. In Liberia, for instance, the maternal mortality ratio was very high - 578 per 100,000 births - in 1999 – approximately a year after internationally monitored elections, which ended large scale fighting. By 2005, the maternal mortality rate had risen even further to about 994 per 100,000 (2009 Rubenstein p. 14). Even in ‘middle income’ countries that are not at war, high levels of armed violence may result in localized health outcomes comparable to those in war zones. In Chiapas, a state of Mexico, for instance, maternal mortality rates were seven times higher than in other sections of the country (2009 Rubenstein p. 14).

Table 3: Comparison of Maternal Mortality and Under Five Mortality in 42 Sub-Saharan Countries

Mortality rates	Countries with recent armed conflict	Countries without recent armed conflict
Maternal mortality rate (median)	1,000/100,000 births	690/100,000 births
Under-five mortality rate (median)	197/1,000 births	137/1,000 live births

Source: O’Hare and Southall (2007) (As cited in 2008 Global Burden of Armed Violence p. 114)

(The study covered 42 Sub-Saharan countries, of which 21 have experienced armed conflict since 1990)

Infectious and communicable diseases are among the most important causes of death during civil war. Of these, malaria and HIV/AIDS are two of the most deadly. Public health experts assert that “civil war has been a basic reason behind the observed increase in the incidence of malaria worldwide” (2003 Collier et al. p. 14). Conflict “affects the incidence of malaria both directly, when non-immune refugees come into contact with infected individuals when they flee through rural and rainforest areas to reach a foreign country, and indirectly, when conflict impairs active control measures” (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002, cited in 2003 Collier et al. p. 36). During conflict, HIV is spread through both consensual intercourse and gender-based violence. Military personnel tend to have higher rates of STDs including HIV - sometimes between two and five times higher than the general population - even during peacetime (2003 Collier et al. p. 27). When military personnel are stationed away from home, social controls with regard to sexual behavior may be lower, increasing the risk of HIV transmission. Not all transmission of HIV in wartime is accidental. Reports have documented that “HIV-infected soldiers made widespread use of rape as a systematic tool of warfare in conflicts in Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone” (2003 Collier et al. p. 28). In Rwanda, documented testimony from female rape survivors confirms the deliberate transmission of HIV.

War often leads to severe damage or destruction of health infrastructure. During armed conflict, combatants or bandits searching for vehicles, medical utensils, recruits or other resources may target health or other social service providers (2003 Atanga et al. p. 140). During the civil war in Sierra Leone, 50 percent of health facilities were lost due to armed rebels deliberately destroying them and displacing staff as part of their strategy to create chaos and undermine the state (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe). Health infrastructure is further eroded by the departure of health workers, the breakdown of water and sanitation systems, food shortages and erosion of the state’s ability to prevent and treat disease (2009 Rubenstein p. 3). In Kosovo, Liberia, Chechnya and Mozambique, over 80 percent of health facilities were destroyed or severely damaged as a result of armed conflict (2009 Rubenstein p. 14). In Iraq, the number of hospital beds declined from a high of 1.95 per 1,000 people in 1970 to a low of 1.3/1,000 people in 2003 with an estimated shortage of 50,000 beds in 2008 (2009 Rubenstein pp. 12-13). The long term effects of the wholesale destruction of medical facilities are likely to be felt the most by the poorest and most vulnerable citizens of war affected countries that are least likely to have alternative healthcare options and, thus, have the greatest need for state provided services (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 25).

As war winds down and people return home, key indicators including infant, child and maternal mortality tend to remain at the startling wartime levels or even increase as water, power, electricity and sanitation remain severely compromised, clinics remain damaged or unstaffed, prevention programs are stalled and health workers remain scarce (2009 Rubenstein p. 16). Moreover, emergency relief funds from external humanitarian donors may drop just at the time when the mortality rates are highest during the transition period between conflict and post conflict (2009 Rubenstein p. 18).

Education


The impact of armed violence on education systems can be equally disastrous. Around 18 percent of the world's primary school age children live in conflict affected countries, however these countries account for 42 percent of the world's out of school children (2011 UNESCO p. 15). Enrollment rates in secondary schools are nearly one third lower in conflict affected countries compared with other developing nations (2011 UNESCO p. 15). The youth literacy rate for conflict affected countries is 79 percent compared with 93 percent for other developing countries (2011 UNESCO p. 15). Moreover, countries affected by armed conflict are among the farthest from reaching the Education for All Targets and the Millennium Development Goals pertaining to education (2011 UNESCO p. 15).

In situations of armed conflict, schooling is frequently disrupted as a result of the destruction or closure of schools or their isolation from regional and national education ministries. Schooling may also be disrupted by curfews or the death or displacement of teachers and students. In the conflict affected eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, it is estimated that up to 70 percent of children do not have access to school (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 19). In East Timor, approximately 90 percent of school buildings were destroyed or badly damaged in the conflict that led to the country's independence (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 19). During the war in Mozambique, 45 percent of primary schools were destroyed (2005 Turner, Ginifer and Cliffe p. 19).

During armed conflict or other manifestations of armed violence, children may fear attending school (or traveling to and from school) as a result of a pervasive climate of fear. In Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, "insurgent groups have repeatedly attacked education infrastructure in general and girls schools in particular" (2011 UNESCO p. 15). Even in places where the education of girls is not systematically opposed for political or religious reasons, increases in the incidence of sexual assault in conflict zones (either from opportunistic attacks or as an instrument of war) have resulted in a climate of fear that significantly decreased school enrollment among girls (2011 UNESCO p. 15).

As is the case with health systems, national education systems are undermined when resources are diverted for military spending. Table 4 identifies 21 of the world's poorest developing countries that spend more on military budgets than on primary education. Moreover, recent studies have shed light on the degree to which education is neglected during wartime by humanitarian aid organizations and donors that frequently do not identify education services as 'lifesaving assistance.' In 2009, humanitarian aid for education in emergencies amounted to approximately \$149 million globally, approximately 2 percent of total humanitarian aid (2011 UNESCO p. 19).

Table 4: Military to Primary Education Expenditure Ratios



Armed Violence and Development - the Gender Dimension

Armed conflict, crime and other forms of violence affect men, women, boys and girls in different ways. During war, men and boys are much more likely to commit and to be the victims of direct acts of violence. In many countries, boys and men are expected to know how to use firearms and/or traditional weapons and, at the very least, be prepared to use violence. Myrittinen notes that in many societies,


“boys are socialized into violent behavior through weapons related rites of passage from boyhood to manhood” and that “the media and popular culture often link violence, arms and masculinity, reinforcing images of conventional gender roles” (2008 GDS pp. 110-111). Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that, throughout the world, the overwhelming majority of perpetrators and victims of armed violence are men (2008 GDS p. 2). However, women are increasingly participating as combatants in armed conflicts and are, therefore, increasingly likely to be included among the direct fatalities of armed conflict. Women have participated as soldiers in 57 armed conflicts since 1990 including in Chechnya, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Uganda (2008 GDS p. 112). As gender equality increases within many armed forces, the percentage of female combatant battle deaths is expected to rise (2008 GDS p. 113).

While women are currently less likely to be counted as direct casualties of armed conflict, they are disproportionately targets of other forms of lethal violence in cases where military forces have attacked civilian populations during or after conflict. Increases in incidents of sexual violence against women have been documented in a wide range of conflicts and, in some cases, rape has been used as a tool of war to punish, humiliate and demoralize civilian populations. In some cultures, acts of “secondary violence” are frequently committed by family members against rape survivors who are perceived as having violated their family’s honor (2008 GDS p. 120). Women and girls are also much more likely to suffer from the most serious indirect effects of war such as reduced access to food, clean water or healthcare. Frequently it is more dangerous for women and girls to travel or circulate within their community during and after periods of armed conflict. This makes it more difficult for women to obtain food, clean water, medical attention and other basic necessities at a time when they may be bearing additional household burdens alone.

Although the risk may be greater during periods of armed conflict, violence against women persists in post-conflict and non-conflict environments. Sexual violence is one of the most underreported crimes, and is often tolerated due to cultural or historical traditions. One of the most difficult forms of violence to document and address is intimate partner violence (IPV – also sometimes referred to as ‘domestic violence’). IPV “can take many forms, both lethal and non-lethal, including acts of physical aggression – such as slapping, battering, hitting, kicking and beating – or psychosocial abuse such as intimidation and humiliation” (2008 GDS p. 117). Even in countries where an act of sexual assault committed by a stranger would be considered a crime and taken seriously by local authorities, intimate partner violence may be considered a ‘private matter’ and, thus, not adequately addressed (2008 GDS p 117). Acts of

intimate partner violence may or may not involve weapons – as conventionally defined - but may involve objects turned into weapons for the purpose of violence against women (2008 GDS p. 116). Moreover, some studies have shown a link between the presence of a gun in the home and incidences of intimate partner violence, even when the weapon was not directly involved in the crime (2008 GDS p. 117).

Table 5: Percentage of Surveyed Women Reporting on IPV, Selected Cases



Source: 2008 Global Burden of Armed Violence p. 118

Armed Violence and Development – the Security Dimension

Historically the term “security” has been used to describe “how states use force to manage threats to their territorial integrity, their autonomy and their domestic political order, primarily from other states” (2000 Bajpai p. 3). This traditional conception of security focused on “the protection and welfare of the state” is sometimes referred today as ‘state security.’ Following the end of the Cold War, scholars and practitioners who recognized the links between security, development and peace, began to consider more comprehensive and less unilateralist notions of security in which “what is central – or what should be central – is the protection and welfare of the individual citizen or human being” (2000 Bajpai p. 3). This approach has come to be called “human security.” While traditional notions of security focus on the security of territory from external aggression, the protection of national interests and the threat of nuclear holocaust (2000 Bajpai p. 13), human security prioritizes the “legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives” (2000 Bajpai p. 13). These concerns hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards (2000 Bajpai p. 13). Later conceptions of human security have drawn attention to an even wider range of threats including state failure, internal conflict, transnational crime, religious and ethnic discord, population growth, state repression and child abuse (2000 Bajpai p. 18).

The idea of human security is generally thought to have been first brought to the attention of a global audience in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report of 1994 (2000 Bajpai p. 10). One of the consulting economists for this report, the late Mahbub ul Haq was also instrumental in the creation of UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI). Haq believed that “fundamentally, human security will be achieved through development, not ... through arms” (Haq, *New Imperatives* p. 1, as quoted in 2000 Bajpai p. 11). However, as the preceding sections of this study have attempted to highlight, since development outcomes can be severely undermined by armed violence, protecting individuals and communities is necessary to foster and sustain human development.

Arms are not only used to do harm; they can also be used to protect people and their rights. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognizes that every state has “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” (UN Charter, article 51). But the UN Charter also requires all member states to “promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms” in order to achieve “economic and social progress and development” (UN Charter Articles 1, 55 and 56 as quoted in Oxfam 2004). Thus, states may use force legitimately, although not all use of force by the state is considered to be legitimate. The question of which criteria legitimates the use of deadly force by the state is beyond

the scope of this study. However, at the broadest level, the use of force can be considered legitimate to the degree that it protects civilians, in other words, to the degree that it ensures human security.

Firearms Availability and Armed Violence

Some experts have tried to disaggregate the economic and human development costs of small arms availability in environments where the ubiquitous presence of these weapons corresponds with elevated rates of armed violence. Direct costs associated with gun violence include “the cost of treating and rehabilitating firearms casualties and the opportunity cost of long-term disability and lost productivity” (2003 Atanga et al. p. 129). Indirect effects include:

“a rise in the incidence and lethality of criminality; the collapse or erosion of social services; a decline in formal and informal economic activities (and potentially a rise in illegal ones); the distortion of investment, savings and revenue collection; and the dislocation of social cohesion and trust in communities” (2003 Atanga et al. p. 130).

In addition to the direct effects of gun violence, economists point out that, when the prevalence of firearms in a community passes a certain tipping point, households may respond to the resulting climate of fear by spending household resources to protect themselves that would otherwise be used for more productive purposes (2003 Atanga et al. p. 129).

Although not all acts of armed violence involve guns, in regions where data is available, evidence suggests that approximately 60 percent of all homicides are carried out with a firearm (2008 GDS p. 75). Member States at the 2000 Millennium Summit identified the poor as being especially threatened by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (2003 Atanga et al. p. 126). Development experts point out that “in many developing countries, basic services such as health care and education, already overstretched, become overwhelmed by the threat and misuse of firearms” undermining human development and progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (2003 Atanga et al. p. 140). Some observers have claimed that serious crime increases in densely populated urban settings primarily as a result of greater stress levels and increased competition for scarce resources (2008 GDS p. 85). But studies have shown that crime rates are as much tied to firearm availability and other factors such as the prevalence of street gangs and the drug trade as to population density (2008 GDS p. 85).

In addition to the direct impact of armed violence on victims, their families and communities, public spending on arms can have high social costs. Due to the high level of secrecy surrounding defense purchases, arms procurement is especially susceptible to corruption. A 2008 report by Oxfam points out that even when military budgets are presented to national parliaments, they rarely contain allocations

for arms procurement, or they appear under ambiguous headings such as 'other expenditures' (2008 Nightingale and Hillier p.3).

Also, elaborate weapons systems may include hidden expenses such as the cost of replacement parts or machinery. When states borrow funds to make expensive arms purchases, they pass on the cost of these purchases to future generations. International obligations "establish the need for an accountable arms procurement process" and require that "potential transfer of arms must be scrutinized for repercussions on developmental progress" (2008 Nightingale and Hillier p. 5). However, currently "fulfillment of these obligations is varied and incoherent and increases the likelihood that arms transfers will undermine sustainable development" (2008 Nightingale and Hillier p. 5).

Armed Violence and Development: Closely Related Challenges and Their Impact

The Illicit Drug Trade as Armed Violence – Challenges for Development

Violence is ubiquitous at every stage in the illicit drug industry from production to trans-shipment to retail marketing (2004 Reuter et al. p. 15). Some of the most high profile incidents of violence in drug producing countries have targeted political leaders and other government officials as a form of intimidation. For instance, during the 1980s and 1990s, Colombian drug cartels attempted to dissuade the country's political leaders from honoring extradition treaties by assassinating political officials, presidential candidates and officers of the court (2004 Reuter et al. p. 15). The extent of this violence in the illicit drug industry is not fully documented since many victims are themselves involved in criminal activity (2004 Reuter et al. p. 15). In the past, some observers of the international drug trade speculated that the negative effects of illicit narcotic sales were primarily experienced in the global north, while the benefits of the drug trade were recouped by developing countries. However, economists and criminologists estimate that "farmers earn only about one percent of all global illicit drug income and that most of the remaining revenues are earned by drug traffickers within developed rather than developing countries" (2004 Reuter et al. p. 11). Furthermore, despite the common perception, most users of opiates (among the most serious and addictive narcotics) live in developing nations (2004 Reuter et al. p. 19). Although India and China have moderate prevalence of opiate use relative to their total populations, they are home to the world's first and third largest populations of opiate addicts respectively (2004 Reuter et al. p. 19). In addition to its disastrous consequences for individuals, families and communities, the illicit drug industry undermines development advances, jeopardizes human rights and exacerbates poverty.

The recent upsurge in violence throughout Mexico has highlighted the degree to which the illicit drug trade can affect countries that are primarily involved in the transshipment of narcotics. Although Mexico is also a producer of illicit drugs, it is primarily known for its role as a “natural smuggling platform” for cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamines imported into the United States (2004 Reuter et al. p. 29). Along with the large quantities of drugs passing northward across Mexico en route to the United States, there is, apparently, a corresponding southward transfer of weapons. Despite having highly restrictive gun ownership laws and a much lower rate of civilian gun ownership than in the United States, violence involving firearms has surged in recent years (2010 Decker and Pyrooz p.140). Although it is difficult to conclusively trace the origin of many of the illegal weapons recovered by police, a 2008 report called attention to the illegal importation of firearms into Mexico from the United States (2010 Decker and Pyrooz p. 140). These examples highlight the transnational nature of illicit drug trafficking and, more generally, of violent crime, even when the visible impact may only be apparent in a single country.

Human Trafficking – A Challenge for Human and Economic Development

Today, although slavery is almost universally perceived as an intolerable violation of the most fundamental human rights, the practice persists and seems to be on the increase. Human trafficking can take many forms including involuntary servitude (forced labor); sex trafficking, debt bondage, involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labor or the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Sexual exploitation is the most commonly identified and prosecuted form of human trafficking, but statistics may be skewed, in part, because prostitution tends to be somewhat visible and is more likely to take place in large population centers. By contrast, those who are forced into agricultural labor may be isolated in very remote areas where they have only minimal contact with strangers. Human trafficking takes place not only trans-regionally (victims from one region of the world being exploited in another region), but also intra-regionally (victims being exploited in a neighboring or geographically close country) and domestically (victims being exploited in their country of citizenship) (2009 Chawla, Me and le Pichon p. 57). Due to variations in enforcement strategies and policy priorities, “some countries limit their enforcement efforts to either foreign trafficking victims or to their own citizens” (2011 USSD p. 18).

International legal instruments stipulate that “a person’s initial consent to participate in prostitution is not legally determinative” of whether or not they are to be considered a victim of sex trafficking (2011 USSD p. 7). However, sometimes, “police, prosecutors, judges and policymakers assume a victim has

free will if she has the physical ability to walk away” even though “this assumption is wholly inconsistent with what is known about the nature of pimping and sex trafficking” (2011 USSD p. 25). Through a sophisticated process of sustained manipulation and domination, traffickers are frequently able to achieve a state of full control over victims that relies only to a limited degree on the direct and immediate threat of physical force.

The international community is just beginning to uncover the depth and breadth of involuntary servitude. Migrants and refugees may be particularly vulnerable to being exploited in this manner although in some countries, forced labor primarily involves the country’s own citizens. While the victims of forced labor may be isolated, the fruits of their labor are believed to frequently contribute to the profit margins of large and well respected companies and the low prices enjoyed by consumers around the world.

IV. INITIATIVES TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE ARMED VIOLENCE

States, inter-governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations have adopted a range of measures to prevent armed violence and mitigate its negative consequences. Since 2003, for instance, the small west African country of Liberia, which was devastated by a decade of civil war, “has become a test case for UN sanctions and monitoring in support of post-conflict efforts, including strictly enforced rules on arms imports” (2008 Nightingale and Hillier p. 2). The commitment to consider sustainable development in arms transfer decisions “is already reflected in most regional arms transfer instruments, which currently cover a total of 89 countries, including nine of the top 11 arms exporters and 14 of the 20 least developed countries (2008 Nightingale and Hillier p. 5). A coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has proposed a comprehensive framework of ‘Global Principles for Arms Transfers’ which would spell out in more detail states obligations under existing instruments of international law (GPAT). Moreover, in 2002, a group of Nobel Laureates proposed the creation of an International Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which would further codify international law prohibiting the transfer of arms in instances when it is known (or should be known) that the recipient will use the weapons to violate norms of human rights or international humanitarian law. Delegates from across the world met in New York in 2011 for a preparatory committee meeting to discuss the details of a future treaty. Since 2005, Parliamentarians for Global Action has been actively involved in the global campaign to adopt a strong and effective Arms Trade Treaty.

Since the late 1990s, development and security professionals have been working together to identify practical ways to support 'security sector reform', defined by the OCDE's Development Assistance Community (DAC) as "the transformation of the 'security system' – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and good governance" (2010 Sedra p. 35). Security sector reform "integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors and focuses on the vulnerable, such as women children and minority groups" (2010 Sedra p. 35). A 2009 joint policy paper published by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Department of Defense and the US Department of State outlines practical "reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law" (2009 USG p. 1). Practical initiatives include: training military forces and police to increase their professionalism and respect for the rule of law; assisting governments and legislatures to establish legal and policy frameworks; supporting the strengthening of civilian management, leadership and oversight structures; and enhancing coordination and cooperation among security related and civil institutions (2009 USG p. 1). Security sector reform is particularly relevant in post-conflict settings and "typically involves defining a country's long-term security needs and vision; conducting an audit of existing security sector institutions, laws, policies and capacities; identifying structural issues, discriminatory practices and other barriers to meeting state security requirements; and developing a plan to bridge the gap between what exists and what is needed to provide effective security" (2009 USG p. 1). Security sector reform may also include efforts to establish clear criteria to assess potential arms purchases (or sales) to determine whether they are appropriate given the real security threats facing the country and in accord with international law.

In response to the problem of human trafficking, 158 countries have signed the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. As of November 2008, 93 signatory countries had adopted specific offences criminalizing the trafficking in persons "at least for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor with no restriction regarding the age or gender of the victim" (2009 Chawla, Me and le Pichon p. 22). Many of the countries that do not have specific legislation outlawing human trafficking report that they "criminalize forms or aspects of trafficking through other offenses such as sexual exploitation, child protection or labor related offenses" (2009 Chawla, Me and le Pichon p. 22).

Progress is being made on many fronts. Much work remains to be done to ensure that armed violence does not undermine fundamental human rights and collective efforts to promote lasting human development.

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