

# Asian Regional Briefing by PGA on Nuclear and Radiological Security Project Overview of Review Conference of States Parties to A/CPPNM

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PGA Regional Asia Parliamentary Webinar to Promote Nuclear and Radiological Security



Related Campaign: Campaign to Promote Nuclear and Radiological Security

On October 26, 2021, PGA's International Peace and Security Program organized a Regional South and South-East Asian Parliamentary Webinar promoting Nuclear and Radiological Security, kindly supported by Global Affairs Canada. Participants joined this Webinar from Cambodia, the Maldives (National Counter-Terrorism Division of Ministry of Defense) and the Philippines. Due to time difference constraints, representatives form the UNODC and the IAEA could not attend the webinar but made a significant contribution by recording their reconstraints.

This Webinar was the third in a series of 8 such Webinars, two in each of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean which PGA will organize over the course of the next 12 months, aimed at facilitating and encouraging parliamentary diplomacy among lemale and male parliamentarians to promote greater universality and implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its Amendment (ACPPNM).

The Webinar was opened by Mr. Peter Barcroft, Senior Director of PGA's International Peace and Security Programme, providing an extensive overview of the contemporaneous importance of the subject matter of the event, also within the context of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and the concomitant need for improved emergency preparedness to address several ongoing, existential threats. The importance of promoting the Women Peace and Security Agenda, mobilizing more women parliamentarians in this arena, was also underscroeded.

The first video presentation from Ms. Francesca Andrian, Associate Programme Officer of the CBRN Terrorism Prevention Programme of the UNDOC introduced the participants to the international Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and UNDOC selected assistance programs and activities. The numerous benefits and advantages of joining ICSANT were also subsequently highlighted. The relevance and importance of ICSANT also in the context of implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the role of parliamentations in its implementation — as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 235 (2016) was also reflected upon for the benefit of all Participants.

The second video presentation was made by Mr. Jonathan Herbach, Legal Officer – Nuclear and Treaty Law Section at the Office of Legal Affairs of the IAEA, who conducted an in-depth review of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, the numerous, substantial benefits account to States Parties as well as sharing with participants the wide range of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology currently being deployed by IAEA, including in addressing zoonotic diseases.

Subsequently, a representative from the National Counter Terrorism Centre of the Maldives suggested to hold more webinars and relevant activities to inform parliamentarians and government officials about those 3 treaties but also issues in regard to Nuclear and

Lastly, and before concluding, Mr. Florian Delsert, Program Associate, International Peace and Security Programme, PGA made a brief presentation setting out a number of different, pragmatic steps that Parliamentarians can take to promote universalization of ICSANT, CPPNM and its Amendment, as well as sharing with participants how Women, and their health, both directly and indirectly, are disproportionately impacted by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), hence the importance also of greater mobilization of female

PGA's IPSP Team will continue to stay in contact with the Workshop Participants/Registrants in the coming months to encourage ongoing follow-up actions, as appropriate, as well as providing requisite advocacy advice. PGA also encouraged participants to reach out and directly contact the representatives from UNODC and IAEA who participated in this Webinar.

For further information on PGA International Peace and Security Program's Global Parliamentary Campaign to Promote Nuclear and Radiological Security, please click here

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














- Ukraine has 15 nuclear reactors producing half of its electricity.
- On February 24<sup>th</sup>, Russian forces took control of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. Following, radiation levels increased about 20-fold as military vehicles stirred contaminated soil. The safety of the site remains vulnerable as unarmoured containment units are not designed to be operated in a war zone.
- On March 3rd, Russian military forces have launched a series of attacks in order to seize control of the Nuclear Plant of Zaporizhzhia, ultimately resulting in heavy damages to one of its buildings as well as damages to 2 reactors compartment and a waste storage facility.
- Since the beginning of the war, operating personnel in Ukrainian power plants have been working under pressure, and nuclear safety has been challenged or degraded in critical areas. In addition, the cooling systems of Ukrainian reactors could be compromised during the war.





Nuclear plant of Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, March 5th



Confinement unit, Chernobyl, Ukraine



#### **CPPNM | Key Provisions**

The CPPNM obliges States Parties to:

- Take specific measures and respect the defined standards of physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material for peaceful purposes (plutonium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and spent fuel)
- Undertake not to export or import nuclear materials or to authorize their transit through their territory unless they have been assured that such materials will be protected during international transport in accordance with the levels of protection determined by the Convention;
- Cooperate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material, by sharing information on missing nuclear material;
- Criminalize specified acts, including the misuse or threat to misuse nuclear material to harm the public; and
- Prosecute or extradite those accused of committing such acts. States Parties undertake to include these offenses as extraditable offenses in any future extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

The Convention also provides a framework for international cooperation in the exchange of information on physical protection.





#### South and Southeastern Asian States Parties to CPPNM

- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh
- Cambodia
- China
- > India
- > Indonesia
- Japan
- Laos
- Myanmar

- Pakistan
- Philippines
- Singapore
- Thailand
- Vietnam

### South and Southeastern Asian States not State Party to CPPNM

- Bhutan
- Brunei
- Malaysia
- Maldives

- > Nepal
- Sri Lanka



### Amendment to CPPNM | Key Provisions

As set out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Amendment to the CPPNM makes it "legally binding to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and transport and also provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences."





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### **ICSANT | Key Provisions** A broader definition (than the Convention on the Protection of Nuclear Material) of materials and facilities covering both military and civilian applications The criminalization of the planning, threat or execution of acts of nuclear terrorism; it obliges states to criminalize these offenses through implementation in national law and to establish penalties according to the seriousness of these crimes Guidelines for extradition and other punitive measures The obligation for States to take all possible measures to prevent and counter the preparations for offenses which take place inside or outside their territory. **Target Signatory State** Target Non-Signatory State



#### South and Southeastern Asian States Parties to ICSANT

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- Indonesia
- Japan
- Singapore
- > Sri Lanka
- > Thailand
- Vietnam

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- Maldives
- Myanmar
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Philippines

#### The Challenge:

The Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) was adopted on 26th October 1979 and entered into force on 8th February, 1987. CPPNM provides for certain levels of physical protection during the international transport of nuclear material, in addition to establishing a general framework for cooperation among States in the protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material. CPPNM also lists certain serious offenses involving nuclear material to be prescribed and punished by States Parties, and for which offenders are subject to a system of extradition or submission for prosecution.

In 1996, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) prepared a report pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 50/53 (A/RES/50/53), which analyzed international legal instruments in place relating to international terrorism. The Report concluded that a need existed to elaborate additional international frameworks in spheres not contemplated in existing treaties. One of the initiatives proposed was prevention of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists.

In the period immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America, the risk of WMD related terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, began to receive more urgent attention on the part of the international community. Nuclear and radiological materials in the illicit market, in parallel, also became a significant point of alarm, in particular in the context of the revelations surrounding the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling networks in the 1980s and 1990s.

The ability of Non-State Actors, including terrorists and terrorist organizations, not only to obtain and use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), but also to gain access to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) materials, continues to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. In recent years, Non-State Actors have sought out new ways to acquire and use WMD in the commission of terrorist acts. With the ever-increasing growth and expansion of legal and illegal trade channels, the potential for access to such weapons and constitutive materials has, regrettably, only become easier.

The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) was adopted on 13th April, 2005. ICSANT criminalizes the possession, use, or threat of use of radioactive devices by Non State Actors, their accomplices, and organizers "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury" or environmental or property damage. ICSANT also requires States Parties governments either to prosecute terrorist suspects in domestic courts or extradite them to their home countries and also provides a framework for increased exchanges of information and greater cooperation between States in the pursuit of terrorist suspects. ICSANT also urges states to ensure the protection of radioactive materials, "taking into account" recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ICSANT also classifies as a punishable offense any attacks on nuclear facilities that could risk the release of radioactive material.

However, as the quantity of nuclear material in circulation for civilian use has steadily increased, both CPPNM and ICSANT were considered not to be fully adequate in the protection of nuclear installations or nuclear materials in domestic use, storage, and transport. Pursuant to Article 2, the CPPNM applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport. On 8 July 2005, the State Parties to the CPPNM adopted the Amendment to the CPPNM. The amended Convention makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. The Amendment also provides for greater cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.

СРРИМ	AMENDMENT TO CPPNM	ICSANT
Adopted: 26 October 1979	Adopted: 8 July 2005	Adopted: 13 April 2005
Opened for Signature: 3 March 1980	Opened for Signature: N/A	Opened for Signature: 14 September 2005
Entered into Force: 8 February 1987	Entered into Force: 8 May 2016	Entered into Force: 7 July 2007
Number of States Parties: 162	Number of States Parties: 125	Number of States Parties: 117
Number of Signatories: 44	Number of Signatories: N/A	Number of Signatories: 115
<b>Depositary</b> : International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Depositary: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Depositary: UN Secretary-General

### **PGA - Nuclear and Radiological**

Security



ACPPNM/RC/2022/4

2022 Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

> 28 March – 1 April 2022 Vienna, Austria

Outcome Document

ACPPNM/RC/2022/4

#### A. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

- 1. A Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material pursuant to Article 16.1 of the Convention as amended was convened by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AEA), as depositary, at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria, from 28 March to 1 April 2022. The Conference reviewed the implementation of the Convention as amended and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation.
- As of 28 March 2022, there were 164 Parties to the Convention, of which 129 are also Parties to the Amendment.
- 3. Representatives of the following 106 Parties to the Amendment to the Convention (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference") participated in the event: Albania; Algeria; Argentina, Armenia; Australia, Aserbaijan; Bangladesh; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Canada; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Demmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador, Estonia; EURATOM; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Humgary; Icaladi, India; Indonesia; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Republic of; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Libva; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Madagascar; Malawi; Malta; Mauritania; Mexico; Montenegro; Morocco; Namibia; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of Moldova; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; State of Palestine; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Utraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; and Viet Nam.
- 4. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, representatives of the following 17 States party to the Convention but not to the Amendment participated in the Conference as observers: Afghanistan; Belarus; Guatemala; Honduras; Iraq; Lao People's Democratic Republic; Lebanon; Mongolia; Mozambique; Oman; South Africa; Sudan; Uganda; United Republic of Tanzania; Yemen; Zambia; and Zimbabwe.
- In accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure, representatives of the following seven States not party to the Convention attended the Conference as observers: Egypt, Iran, Islamic Republic of; Malaysia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Sierra Leone; Sri Lanka; and Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of.
- 6. In accordance with Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure, the following six inter-governmental organizations attended the Conference as observers: the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the European Union, the IAEA, the International Criminal Police Organization and the United Nations.
- 7. In accordance with Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure, the following 11 non-governmental organizations also attended the Conference as observers: the Arab Institute for Security Studies, Fundación Argentina Global, Kimg's College London (Institute for Applied Security Studies), the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nuclear Transport Solutions, Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the University of Melbourne (Project on nuclear energy and global

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governance), the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, the World Institute for Nuclear Security and the World Nuclear Transport Institute .<sup>1</sup>

- 8. Preparations for the Conference were undertaken in accordance with a Provisional Roadmap towards the Conference, as agreed by the Parties to the Amendment participating in an informal meeting held at IAEA Headquarters from 10 to 11 December 2018. Two meetings of Legal and Technical Experts were held at IAEA Headquarters from 22 to 26 July and from 12 to 15 November 2019, chaired by Mr Tomás Bieda (Argentina) and Mr Robert Floyd (Australia). In December 2020 and February 2021, the IAEA convened two sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference, which undertook preparations for the Conference including with respect to draft Rules of Procedure and a draft annotated agenda. The Preparatory Committee was chaired by Mr Vilmos Coserveny (Hungary) and Mr Robert Floyd (Australia).
- The Conference was opened by the Director General of the IAEA, Mr Rafael Mariano Grossi, who served as Secretary-General of the Conference.
- 10. The Conference elected His Excellency Mr Benno Laggner of the Swiss Confederation and His Excellency Mr Suleiman Dauda Umar of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as Co-Presidents. The Conference also elected as Vice Presidents: for North America, His Excellency Mr Troy Lulashnyk (Canada); for Latin America, His Excellency Mr Juan Francisco Facetti (Paraguay); for Western Europe, His Excellency Mr Alessandro Cortese (Italy); for Eastern Europe, Her Excellency Ms Barbara Zivokelj (Slovenia); for Africa, Her Excellency Ms Nada Kruger (Namibia); for the Middle East and South Asia, His Excellency Mr Aftab Ahmad Khokher (Pakistan); for South East Asia and the Pacific, Her Excellency Ms Morakot Sriswasdi (Thailand); and for the Far East, His Excellency Mr Hikhara Takeshi (Japana).
- Also at its opening meeting, the Conference adopted its Rules of Procedure (ACPPNM/RC/2022/1) and its Agenda (ACPPNM/RC/2022/2).
- The Conference accepted the report of the Bureau on its examination of the credentials of the delegates of the Parties participating in the Conference (ACPPNM/RC/2022/3).
- 13. National statements were delivered by 76 Parties to the Amendment, five States party to the Convention but not to the Amendment, and two States not party to the Convention.
- 14. In addition to national statements, the agenda included four topical sessions with a mix of presentations and interventions. The topical sessions covered: provisions on physical protection (Articles 2A to 4 and Annexes I and II); provisions on international cooperation (Articles 5 and 6); provisions on criminalization (Articles 7 to 13, 14.2 and 14.3); and submission of information on laws and regulations (Article 14.1) and other provisions (the Preamble and Articles 1 to 2 and 15 to 23).
- 15. Six inter-governmental organizations addressed the Conference.
- 16. A session was also held with non-governmental organizations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> NGO attendance was limited to the following sessions: 1) Opening; 2) Election of the Co-Presidents; 3) Statements by the Co-Presidents; 4) Adoption of the Rules of Procedure; 5) Adoption of the Agenda; 6; Election of Officers; 7) Examination of Delegates' Credentials; 6) Programme of Work; 9) National Statements; 10) Statements by Inter-governmental Organizations; 11) Session with Non-governmental Organizations; 13) Universalization; 15) Adoption of the Final Document of the Conference; and 16) Closing.

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 A dedicated session was included to promote the further universalization of the Convention and its Amendment.

#### B. REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ADEQUACY OF THE CONVENTION AS AMENDED

- 18. The Conference welcomed the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on 8 May 2016. The Conference emphasized the importance of full and effective implementation of the obligations under the Convention as amended.
- 19. The Conference recognized the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy, science, and technology.
- 20. The Conference reasserted that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State, and noted the responsibility of each State, in accordance with its respective national and international obligations, to maintain at all times effective and comprehensive nuclear security of nuclear material and facilities used for peaceful purposes.
- 21. The Conference acknowledged that nuclear security measures may enhance public confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear applications. The Conference also acknowledged that these applications contribute to Parties' sustainable development and that it should be ensured that measures to strengthen nuclear security do not hamper international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear applications.
- 22. The Conference expressed concern about existing and emerging nuclear security threats and stressed the importance of international cooperation and fostering a broad dialogue in this regard.
- 23. The Conference recognized that physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is a key element of nuclear security. The Conference reaffirmed that physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is of vital importance for the protection of public health, safety, the environment and national and international security.
- 24. The Conference noted the continuing need to strengthen and maintain effective physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in use, storage and transport, and of nuclear facilities.
- 25. The Conference acknowledged that physical protection is linked or, in many cases, interconnected with other areas of nuclear security, such as, nuclear material accounting and control, information security and computer security, with the elements of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information, nuclear security culture and nuclear security measures for material out of regulatory control. The Conference further acknowledged that to achieve effective nuclear security, measures in these areas should be implemented in a risk-informed, coordinated manner.
- 26. The Conference noted that key changes and factors related to the prevailing situation include expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, novel advanced reactor technologies, and changes in the threat and risk environment, including those related to technological developments in general. The Conference emphasized that new technologies are also used to strengthen nuclear security, including physical protection.

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- 27. During the Conference, views were exchanged on good practices, lessons learned, and challenges associated with the provisions on physical protection, including nuclear material transport security.
- 28. The Conference noted that a State's physical protection should be based on the State's current evaluation of the threat, taking into account the prevailing situation, including emerging threats and risks.
- 29. The Conference recognized that there are physical protection recommendations and guidance documents, including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications, that are updated regularly and provide guidance on contemporary means of achieving effective levels of physical protection.
- 30. The Conference highlighted the importance of international cooperation to strengthen the ability of Parties to implement the Convention as amended, including making resources and support available to Parties upon request that may assist them in implementing the Convention as amended, including those offered by the IAEA, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, INTERPOL, and other relevant international organizations and initiatives, as well as through regional and bilateral cooperation.
- 31. The Conference reaffirmed the importance of strengthening further international cooperation to establish, in conformity with the national law of each Party and with the Convention as amended, effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, which includes the identification of points of contact and the exchange of information as outlined in Article 5 of the Convention as amended.
- 32. The Conference encouraged States to make use of the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) which helps States upon request in strengthening national physical protection regimes in line with the Convention as amended, and encouraged States, together with the IAEA, to share the identified good practices while protecting the confidentiality of this information, as appropriate. The Conference recognized also the importance of International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions, as well as Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs) which may help to strengthen a State Party's implementation of the Convention as amended, and encouraged States to use them on a voluntary basis.
- 33. The Conference highlighted the experience acquired by Parties in the implementation of the Convention as amended. The Conference noted the importance of continued knowledge sharing among Parties, taking into account the need to protect confidentiality of information.
- 34. During the Conference, experiences, lessons learned, good practices and implementation challenges regarding criminalization provisions under the Convention as amended were shared by Parties. The role of the IAEA, UNDOC and INTERPOL in assisting Parties, upon their request, in implementing the Convention as amended was highlighted. The Conference also reaffirmed the importance of other relevant international legal instruments, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).
- 35. The Conference reiterated that offences relating to nuclear material and nuclear facilities are a matter of grave concern and that the States Parties should continue to strengthen measures to address such offences in their national law as appropriate in accordance with the Convention as amended.

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- 36. The Conference reaffirmed the desire to avert the potential dangers posed by illicit trafficking, the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and underscored the importance of physical protection against such acts.
- 37. During the Conference, views were exchanged with regard to good practices, lessons learned, and challenges associated with implementation of Article 14.1 and other provisions in the Convention as amended.
- 38. The Conference urged all States Parties that have not yet done so to inform the depositary of their laws and regulations which give effect to the Convention as amended without further delay and expressed appreciation to the Parties that have done so.
- 39. The Conference reaffirmed the importance of diversity and inclusivity, including gender equality, within nuclear security workforces and national physical protection regimes, including capacity building through ensuring equal access to education and training. The Conference further reaffirmed the importance of professional competence within nuclear security workforces and national physical protection regimes.
- 40. The Conference came to the conclusion that, in the light of the prevailing situation, the Convention as amended is adequate as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annexes.
- 41. The Conference noted that the required number of Parties have requested the Director General of the LAEA, as the depositary, to convene a next conference, in accordance with Article 16.2 of the Convention as amended.

#### C. UNIVERSALIZATION

- 42. The Conference emphasized the importance of achieving universal adherence to and full implementation of the Convention and its Amendment.
- 43. The Conference welcomed those States that became Party to the Convention and its Amendment in the lead-up to the Conference.
- 44. The Conference reaffirmed the benefits of becoming party to the Convention and its Amendment, which include contributing to nuclear security through strengthening physical protection and criminalization of offences under the Convention as amended and enhancing international cooperation in these areas.
- 45. The Conference expressed appreciation for the work of the IAEA in promoting universalization of the Convention and its Amendment and encouraged the IAEA to continue efforts to assist States, upon request, in adhering to and fully implementing the Convention and its Amendment.
- 46. The Conference welcomed the contribution of non-governmental organizations to promoting universalization of the Convention and its Amendment.
- 47. The Conference called upon all States that have not yet done so to become Party to the Convention and its Amendment



We welcome your questions and comments.

### **THANK YOU**

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