

Caribbean Regional Briefing by PGA on Nuclear and Radiological Security Project Overview of Review Conference of States Parties to A/CPPNM

Peter Barcroft, Senior Director, International Peace and Security Program, PGA
















- Ukraine has 15 nuclear reactors producing half of its electricity.
- On February 24th, Russian forces took control of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. Following, radiation levels increased about 20-fold as military vehicles stirred contaminated soil. The safety of the site remains vulnerable as unarmoured containment units are not designed to be operated in a war zone.
- On March 3rd, Russian military forces have launched a series of attacks in order to seize control of the Nuclear Plant of Zaporizhzhia, ultimately resulting in heavy damages to one of its buildings as well as damages to 2 reactors compartment and a waste storage facility.
- Since the beginning of the war, operating personnel in Ukrainian power plants have been working under pressure, and nuclear safety has been challenged or degraded in critical areas. In addition, the cooling systems of Ukrainian reactors could be compromised during the war.





Nuclear plant of Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, March 5th



Confinement unit, Chernobyl, Ukraine



CPPNM | Key Provisions

The CPPNM obliges States Parties to:

- Take specific measures and respect the defined standards of physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material for peaceful purposes (plutonium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and spent fuel)
- Undertake not to export or import nuclear materials or to authorize their transit through their territory unless they have been assured that such materials will be protected during international transport in accordance with the levels of protection determined by the Convention;
- Cooperate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material, by sharing information on missing nuclear material;
- Criminalize specified acts, including the misuse or threat to misuse nuclear material to harm the public; and
- Prosecute or extradite those accused of committing such acts. States Parties undertake to include these offenses as extraditable offenses in any future extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

The Convention also provides a framework for international cooperation in the exchange of information on physical protection.



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Caribbean States Parties to CPPNM

- Antiqua and Barbuda
- Bahamas
- Dominica
- Dominican Republic
- Grenada
- Guyana
- Jamaica
- Saint Kitts and Nevis
- Saint Lucia
- Trinidad and Tobago

Caribbean States not State Party to CPPNM

- Barbados targeted by PGA
- Belize targeted by PGA
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines targeted by PGA
- Suriname targeted by PGA



Amendment to CPPNM | Key Provisions

As set out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Amendment to the CPPNM makes it "legally binding to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and transport and also provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences."



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Caribbean States Parties to A/CPPNM

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- Jamaica
- Saint Kitts and Nevis
- Saint Lucia

Caribbean States not State Party to A/CPPNM

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ICSANT | Key Provisions A broader definition (than the Convention on the Protection of Nuclear Material) of materials and facilities covering both military and civilian applications The criminalization of the planning, threat or execution of acts of nuclear terrorism; it obliges states to criminalize these offenses through implementation in national law and to establish penalties according to the seriousness of these crimes Guidelines for extradition and other punitive measures The obligation for States to take all possible measures to prevent and counter the preparations for offenses which take place inside or outside their territory. **Target Signatory State** Target Non-Signatory State

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Caribbean States Parties to ICSANT

- Antigua and Barbuda
- Dominican Republic
- Jamaica
- > St. Kitts and Nevis
- > St. Lucia
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

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The Challenge:

The Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) was adopted on 26th October 1979 and entered into force on 8th February, 1987. CPPNM provides for certain levels of physical protection during the international transport of nuclear material, in addition to establishing a general framework for cooperation among States in the protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material. CPPNM also lists certain serious offenses involving nuclear material to be prescribed and punished by States Parties, and for which offenders are subject to a system of extradition or submission for prosecution.

In 1996, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) prepared a report pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 50/53 (A/RES/50/53), which analyzed international legal instruments in place relating to international terrorism. The Report concluded that a need existed to elaborate additional international frameworks in spheres not contemplated in existing treaties. One of the initiatives proposed was prevention of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists.

In the period immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America, the risk of WMD related terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, began to receive more urgent attention on the part of the international community. Nuclear and radiological materials in the illicit market, in parallel, also became a significant point of alarm, in particular in the context of the revelations surrounding the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling networks in the 1980s and 1990s.

The ability of Non-State Actors, including terrorists and terrorist organizations, not only to obtain and use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), but also to gain access to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) materials, continues to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. In recent years, Non-State Actors have sought out new ways to acquire and use WMD in the commission of terrorist acts. With the ever-increasing growth and expansion of legal and illegal trade channels, the potential for access to such weapons and constitutive materials has, regrettably, only become easier.


The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) was adopted on 13th April, 2005. ICSANT criminalizes the possession, use, or threat of use of radioactive devices by Non State Actors, their accomplices, and organizers "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury" or environmental or property damage. ICSANT also requires States Parties governments either to prosecute terrorist suspects in domestic courts or extradite them to their home countries and also provides a framework for increased exchanges of information and greater cooperation between States in the pursuit of terrorist suspects. ICSANT also urges states to ensure the protection of radioactive materials, "taking into account" recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ICSANT also classifies as a punishable offense any attacks on nuclear facilities that could risk the release of radioactive material.

However, as the quantity of nuclear material in circulation for civilian use has steadily increased, both CPPNM and ICSANT were considered not to be fully adequate in the protection of nuclear installations or nuclear materials in domestic use, storage, and transport. Pursuant to Article 2, the CPPNM applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport. On 8 July 2005, the State Parties to the CPPNM adopted the Amendment to the CPPNM. The amended Convention makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. The Amendment also provides for greater cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.

СРРИМ	AMENDMENT TO CPPNM	ICSANT
Adopted: 26 October 1979	Adopted: 8 July 2005	Adopted: 13 April 2005
Opened for Signature: 3 March 1980	Opened for Signature: N/A	Opened for Signature: 14 September 2005
Entered into Force: 8 February 1987	Entered into Force: 8 May 2016	Entered into Force: 7 July 2007
Number of States Parties: 162	Number of States Parties: 125	Number of States Parties: 117
Number of Signatories: 44	Number of Signatories: N/A	Number of Signatories: 115
Depositary : International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Depositary: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Depositary: UN Secretary-General

PGA - Nuclear and Radiological

Security





We welcome your questions and comments.

THANK YOU

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