



Government
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Canada



WEAPONS THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM DIVISION (IGA)

Biological & Chemical Security &
UNSCR-1540 Implementation Programming

Workshop – Universalization & Implementation of UNSCR 1540 & BTWC

Port of Spain, Trinidad, April 30th 2019

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons And Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)

Began at the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit as a 10-year, \$20 billion initiative

“We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology. We call on all countries to join us in adopting the set of non-proliferation principles we have announced today.”

Statement by G8 Leaders in Kananaskis, June 27, 2002

- Supports and coordinates projects and activities in chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological security
- More than \$25 billion in programming worldwide in efforts to prevent CBRN proliferation and terrorism
- Mandate has evolved and been extended ~ after initial focus on Russia and FSU, the GP now programs globally to mitigate all manner of CBRN threats
- Chair coincides with Presidency of G7 ~ Canada (2018)



Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction

www.gpwmd.com

Global Partnership Member Countries

- Began as a G8 Initiative, but now includes 31 active members:

Australia	France	Kazakhstan	Rep of Korea
Belgium	Georgia	Mexico	Spain
Canada	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden
Chile	Hungary	New Zealand	Switzerland
Czech Republic	Ireland	Norway	Ukraine
Denmark	Italy	Philippines	United Kingdom
EU	Japan	Poland	United States
Finland	Jordan	Portugal	

Participation and implementation by key partners, including

BTWC	OPCW	UNODA	INTERPOL
IFBA	OIE	ASEAN	WHO

Canada's Weapons Threat Reduction Program

- **Implements** projects with partner countries, international organizations, NGOs and other government departments to mitigate threats posed by CBRN weapons and related materials
- **Delivered** close to \$1.4 billion in programming since 2002
- **Funding level** is \$73.4M/year
- **Ongoing Canadian Priority:** Mandate & funding renewed indefinitely in 2018

Key Activities

- Prevent, detect and respond to WMD threats
- Secure or destroy dangerous CBRN materials
- Protect and improve security at facilities
- Strengthen global networks & support international CBRN initiatives
- Build partner capacity to meet international obligations

Nuclear &
Radiological
Security

Biological
Security

Chemical
Weapons

UNSCR 1540
Implementation

Conventional
Weapons

CB1540 Programming in support of GoC Priorities & Commitments

CB1540 Programming to support:

WTRP Treasury Board Submission (2018)
WTRP Priority Review for FY2018-20

GoC International Commitments
IGA Summative Evaluation (2018)

Canada welcomes OPCW actions to counter impunity for use of chemical weapons

From: [Global Affairs Canada](#)

Statement

June 27, 2018 - Ottawa, Ontario - Global Affairs Canada

The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement:

"Any use of chemical weapons is an abhorrent breach of international law and Canada strongly supports efforts to ensure that perpetrators of such crimes are held to account.

"Canada welcomes today's decision by the special Conference of States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention to task the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat with identifying those who use chemical weapons in Syria.



PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA
JUSTIN TRUDEAU

While in Singapore, the Prime Minister announced Canada-ASEAN Cooperation to Mitigate Biological Threats,



In support of the G20 efforts on global health, the Prime Minister announced an additional \$10 million contribution to the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness, which will help develop new life saving vaccines to prevent and contain infectious disease outbreaks.



1540 Committee



Global Health Security Agenda

Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Package

GHSA Action Package Phase 3

Five-Year Target: A whole-of-government national biosafety and biosecurity system is in place, ensuring that especially dangerous pathogens are identified, held, secured and monitored in a minimal number of facilities according to best practices; biological risk management training and educational outreach are conducted to promote a shared culture of responsibility; reduce dual-use risks; mitigate biological proliferation and deliberate use threats; and ensure safe transfer of biological agents; and country-specific biosafety and biosecurity legislation, laboratory licensing, and pathogen control measures are in place as appropriate.

As Measured by: Number of countries who have completed/Completion of a national framework and comprehensive oversight system for pathogen biosafety and biosecurity, strain collections, containment laboratories and monitoring systems that includes identification and storage of national strain collections in a minimal number of facilities.

Desired National Impact: Implementation of a comprehensive, sustainable and legally embedded national oversight program for biosafety and biosecurity, including the safe and secure use, storage, disposal, and containment of pathogens found in laboratories and a minimal number of holdings across the country, including research, diagnostic, and biotechnology facilities. A cadre of biological risk management experts possesses the skillset to train others within their respective institutions. Strengthened, sustainable biological risk management best practices are in place using common educational materials. Rapid and culture-free diagnostics are promoted as a facet of biological risk management. The transport of infectious substances will also be taken into account.

Country Commitments to Action Package:

- **Leading countries:** Canada, Denmark, Kenya, Peru, Portugal, Spain
- **Contributing countries:** Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cote d'Ivoire, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States
- **Contributing international organizations:** FAO, IAEA, INTERPOL, OIE, WHO



Beyond Ebola:

A G7 Agenda to Help Prevent Future Crises and Enhance Security in Africa

Lübeck, April 15, 2015

In order to minimise biological risks in partner countries as foreseen by the G7 Global Partnership and pursuing synergies with existing international activities including through the WHO and initiatives, e.g. the Global Health Security Agenda and the implementation of International Health Regulations and similar health-security commitments, we strive to:

- support capacity development and training to augment prevention, detection, preparedness and response in case of outbreaks of highly infectious diseases and other events relating to biological security;
- improve surveillance, detection, diagnostics capabilities (including specialised laboratories), and multi-sectoral workforce skills needed to prevent, detect, instantly share information and rapidly respond to outbreaks of highly infectious diseases;
- achieve sustainability including through focussing on issues such as equipment maintenance, enhancing and maintaining facilities, and human resources management, including relevant training (e.g. "train the trainers" activities);
- strengthen human and veterinary public health systems, including through providing training, and assisting with skill development;
- improve the management and, where possible, consolidation and reduction of holdings of potentially dangerous biological material and samples, and support the establishment and strengthening of biosecurity and biosafety systems within the country;
- work towards common targets for measuring assistance to accelerate health security implementation;
- enhance the work of national and regional biological safety associations;
- strengthen interregional and international cooperation, including through making best use of international fora, such as the African Union, WHO, the FAO, the OIE, the United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention.

22 May 2019

CB1540 Project Coordination

Key International Partners and Coordination processes:

<p>Global Partnership : Biannual meetings of the GPWG and its 4 sub-working groups (BSWG, CBRN WG, CSWG & NRSWG), “matchmaking” sessions and side meetings with key partners</p>	<p>GP Biological Coordination meetings: Since 2010, Canada has been hosting/chairing GP biosecurity coordination meetings in Geneva on the margins of meetings of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (e.g. MX, MSP, RevCon)</p>	<p>Project specific Jordan Technical Advisory Committee, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and other complex initiatives that involve multiple parties.</p>
<p>United Kingdom: Closest collaborating partner 2-way flow of funds through MoU Regular Project coordination meetings</p>	<p>1540 Program Coordination Calls Monthly coordination calls with Project implementers (e.g. OAS, CARICOM, UNLIREC, PGA, UNODC, Stimson) and stakeholders (e.g. 1540, US-EXBS) to review progress and identify potential synergies or overlaps</p>	<p>ASEAN Regular meetings convened by the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) to review IGA-funded projects with ASEAN Member States to Mitigate Biological Threats in the ASEAN Region</p>
<p>United States: Frequent Project coordination Different programmatic approaches on BIO limits direct collaborations. Monthly coord. calls on GP CSWG</p>	<p>UNSGM “Friends” Group UK-led process that brings together like-minded countries to advance the Action Plan for strengthening the <i>Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons</i></p>	<p>Global Health Security Agenda Regular PHAC-led GoC coordination meetings and participation in Action Package 3 (Biosafety/Security) coordination meetings</p>
<p>Trilateral/Quad Coordination Canada to host next meeting in Ottawa this fall.</p>	<p>OPCW, BTWC, WHO, OIE & INTERPOL Annual (at minimum) project review and coordination meetings with senior officials and project implementers</p>	<p>GAC & OGDs Ongoing consultations, coordination and project identification & delivery</p>


Biological Threats

- Many countries have researched and developed Biological Weapons (BW)
- Terrorist groups have used and continue to seek BW
- Deadly pathogens (e.g. anthrax, plague, and Ebola) that are source for BW are naturally-occurring and vulnerable to terrorist acquisition
- A single biological incident ~ whether natural, accidental, or deliberate (i.e. bioterrorism) ~ could spread globally and create a pandemic
- Outbreaks as “proliferation events”
 - 300,000+ Ebola samples in W Africa post 2014/15
- Impossible to know “how much” and where everything is
- No OPCW or IAEA-equivalents to count and monitor materials and locations
- Total destruction or elimination rarely an option



Health/Security Interface

Strengthened public health and response for natural outbreaks
=
Strengthened preparedness for deliberate outbreak



Enhanced global biological security requires increased collaboration between the security and health sectors at the “health-security interface”, where respective interests & responsibilities coincide.

Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)

Prevent 3: Biosafety & Biosecurity

Detect 1: National Laboratory Systems

Detect 2/3: Real-Time Surveillance

Respond 2: Deliberate Use

GP Biosecurity “Deliverables”

- Secure and account for materials that represent biological proliferation threats
 - Develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures to prevent, prepare for, detect and disrupt the deliberate misuse of biological agents
 - Strengthen national and international capacities to rapidly identify, confirm/assess and respond to deliberate biological attacks
 - Reinforce and strengthen the BTWC and biological non-proliferation principles, practices and instruments
 - Reduce biological proliferation risks through the advancement and promotion of safe and responsible conduct
-
- These Deliverables guide BIO programming for all GP partners
 - In 2018, 102 projects were implemented or funded by 11 GP partners (Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK & US) valued at more than US\$385M

www.gpwmd.com/bswg-deliverables

Partnering for Global Health Security

Canada's WTRP has been working with partners since 2003 to mitigate biological threats at the "health-security interface"

WHO: > \$30 million for

- Promoting & strengthening WHO ability to respond to CBRN events & Strengthening core-capacities in biosafety and biosecurity




OIE: > \$15M million for

- Promoting & strengthening biosafety and biosecurity




Bilaterally in Africa, Americas, Asia & the Middle East

- \$10M for "Biobanking" Projects in Sierra Leone & Lagos State, Nigeria
- \$7M for Security and capacity-building upgrades at vet laboratories in Nigeria and Ghana
- >\$60M to strengthen Jordan's capacities to detect, identify and respond to a CBRN attack or incident originating in Syria
- \$19 M to Mitigate Biological Threats in ASEAN region



UNCLASSIFIED



Priority Issues and Regions

As 2018 chair of the GP's Biological Security Working Group (BSWG), Canada focused collective attention on developing new approaches and solutions for:

- sustainable biosafety & biosecurity
 - Ongoing Projects w Chatham House & OIE, and in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana
- strengthening global mechanisms for responding to & investigating deliberate use of disease
 - Ongoing collaboration with UNODA (BTWC), UNSGM, WHO & NTI

Further strengthen ties and collaborative partnerships with relevant OGDs, international organisations and partner countries

Biological threats are in all regions, but priority emphasis on West & Sub-Saharan Africa, ASEAN region and Middle East

Chemical Weapons


Threats:

- Chemical Weapons have been used more than any other type of WMD
- Wide-scale development and use by states, beginning w WWI
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) EIF in 1997
 - To date, >98% of “declared” stockpiles destroyed (including Russia, Syria and Libya)
- CWC Norm under threat
 - Undeclared stockpiles
 - Precursor availability
 - Repeated use in Syria and Iraq (state and non-state) since 2012
 - VX use in Malaysia (Feb 2017) & Novichok incident in UK (March 2018)
- Terrorist interest and use



Chemical Security

Activities guided by the GP' "Strategic Vision" and associated "Action Plan"



49 projects implemented or funded over the past 5 years by 8 GP partners (Canada, EU, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US) valued at US\$167M

Chemical Weapons Destruction

Russia: Billions contributed by GP to support CWD



- Canada provided >\$200M to construction of Shchuch'ye & Kizner CWDFs

Libya and Syria: GP partners made key contributions to CWD efforts in both countries



- Canada provided >\$6.5M for CWD in Libya and \$17M for Syria

Preparedness, Response & Investigation



OPCW

Provision of assistance to & through International Organisations (e.g. OPCW, INTERPOL) and to at-risk partner countries (e.g. Jordan and Iraq) to enhance capabilities to prevent, detect and respond effectively to the use or threat of use of CW or toxic chemicals as weapons by states or NSA



INTERPOL



Support for OPCW, Investigation & Attribution



OPCW

Canada is among the largest donors to the OPCW

- more than C\$33M to mitigate and respond to Syrian CW threats (includes US\$2M for JIM).
- \$7.5M for the new OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology
 - \$2M for Strengthening the Investigative, Analytical & Security Capabilities of the OPCW

Wilton Park conference on “Attribution of responsibility for the use of chemical weapons “ (27-29 March)

Letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Leadership Panel of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the Secretary-General



UNSCR 1540 Implementation Assistance

- UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) places legally binding obligations on States to prevent proliferation of CBRN weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials to *non-state actors*, including terrorists and traffickers
- Lack of legislation, regulation, and controls creates opportunities for terrorists to acquire and traffic WMDs and related materials
- The Program assists Member States to fulfill their obligations under this resolution by building capacity for legislation and regulation, controls and enforcement



UNSCR 1540 Implementation Assistance - II

The Portfolio and its pillars

- **Implementation support** for UNSCR 1540
- **CBRN training** and provision of related equipment
- **Legislative and regulatory assistance**
- **Enhancement of export controls** and border security measures



UNSCR 1540 Implementation Assistance - III

- UNSCR 1540 Assistance Support Initiative (Stimson Center) to catalogue all 1540 beneficiary-donor opportunities; Security Trade Efficiency Platform in S-E Asia; CW Compendium
- Support for **CARICOM's 1540 Coordinator** position
- Legislative Implementation of UNSCR 1540 in Latin America and the Caribbean (OAS & UNLIREC)
- Funding to DND to conduct CBRN Training for Malaysian Armed Forces
- Support to **Parliamentarians for Global Action** to promote universality and national implementation of legal instruments in support of UNSCR 1540 & BTWC



UNSCR 1540 Implementation Assistance - IV

Ongoing Activities for FY 2019-20

- Further support to the UNSCR 1540 ASI, STEP in S-E Asia, CW Compendium
- Ongoing support for **CARICOM's UNSCR 1540 Implementation Program Coordinator** to provide expert support to the 14 independent CARICOM Member States in their efforts to implement, report on and achieve UNSCR 1540 obligations
- Support to **Parliamentarians for Global Action** to promote universality and national implementation of legal instruments in support of implementation of UNSCR 1540
- Legislative Implementation of UNSCR 1540 in Latin America and the Caribbean (OAS & UNLIREC)



Questions & Comments?

Thank you very much!

Rickard James Kerwin, CD, PMP, P.Eng.

Project Leader / Chef de projet

Biological & Chemical Security, UNSCR 1540 Programming

Sécurité biologique et chimique, programmation liée à la résolution 1540

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